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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. A NEW GREAT GAME? 
Despite their best intentions, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin could not dissuade talk of U.S. and Russian competition in 
Central Asia and a 21st century “Great Game.”  It was not for lack of effort.  The two 
presidents issued a joint statement in May 2002 recognizing each other’s interest in 
cooperation in the areas of the former Soviet Union, vowing to support one another in the 
fight against global terrorism.  In the joint declaration, the two leaders indicated that, 
In Central Asia…we recognize our common interest in promoting the 
stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this 
region.  The United States and Russia reject the failed model of “Great 
Power” rivalry that can only increase the potential for conflict in those 
regions.1 
But analysts, academics, and pundits alike are drawn to the historical Great Game cliché.  
Modern day visions of Mackinder-like quests to control Eurasia’s heartland abound, with 
energy and geopolitics driving the competition between the United States and Russia. 
Many of the assumptions of such great games mask the nuances underneath such 
grandiose visions.  Outside the scope of this study, the supposed new “Great Game” 
might not either be great or a game.  More appropriately, the assumptions of great game 
analogies channels readers to consider the motivations and strategies of only the key 
actors involved.  Just as Russia and Great Britain were the foci of the great power 
competition in Central Asia and Afghanistan in the 19th century, so too are Russia and the 
United States allegedly jockeying for dominance and influence in the region in the 21st 
century.  However, a major difference between 19th century and 21st Eurasia is that 
nation-states now exist in the space once occupied by khanates, clans, and nomadic 
peoples. 
Often overlooked in modern Great Game analogies are the motivations, goals, and 
strategies of those states occupying the “playing board” of the Great Game.  These states 
too conduct foreign policies, which reflect their position in the international order and 
                                                 
1 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Text of Joint Declaration,” 24 May 2002.  Available 
online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-2.html  Last Accessed June 2005. 
2 
their capacity to address their concerns.  Such is the case with Kyrgyzstan.  A nation with 
only a formal fourteen year history but with a legacy of several centuries, Kyrgyzstan has 
recently found itself the focus of intense interest from the larger states.  Like most small 
states, Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy with larger states is both framed and constrained by a 
peculiar combination of geographical, structural, and identity factors, which contribute to 
the broader strategies the state pursues. 
B. FACTORS INFLUENCING KYRGYZSTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Geographical Factors2 
Several aspects of Kyrgyzstan’s spatial and physical geography influence the 
priorities Kyrgyzstan seeks in its foreign policy.  Kyrgyzstan shares a border with three 
former Soviet republics - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan - as well as an 858 km 
border with China.  Although border disputes have mostly been settled with its neighbors, 
Kyrgyzstan still has outstanding claims on its border demarcation with Uzbekistan, often 
straining relations between the two countries.   
Relations with Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors are mostly cordial, but retain latent 
potential to sour at any given moment.  Kazakhstan has the most in common historically 
with Kyrgyzstan, but is substantially larger economically and militarily and also enjoys a 
closer bond with Russia.  Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan face similar problems as the smallest 
and poorest of the five former Soviet Republics.  Tajikistan’s uncontrolled mountainous 
border with Kyrgyzstan presents multiple challenges with trafficking and other illicit 
activities.  Kyrgyzstan has kept a wary eye on its two most powerful neighbors, 
Uzbekistan and China.  Kyrgyzstan fears Uzbekistan’s inclinations to be a regional 
hegemon, and has often felt the wrath of its leader President Islam Karimov.  Kyrgyzstan 
values its growing economic relationship with China, but also fears long-term losses of 
its sovereignty through China’s soft, patient approach via economic purchasing and 
investment. 
Kyrgyzstan’s physical geography provides strengths as well as weaknesses.  The 
country is 90% mountainous, with several valleys supporting a majority of the 
population.  Kyrgyzstan’s extreme terrain provides a highly desirable natural barrier with                                                  
2 This section draws heavily on Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, “Sources of Conflict and Paths to 
U.S. Involvement” in Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna ed., Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2003), 318.  
3 
China and Tajikistan, but also opens itself up to traffickers and extremist groups who 
thrive in these uncontrolled environments.  Kyrgyzstan’s natural geography carries 
another double-sided consideration.  Since the country is so mountainous, it controls 
several of the headways for much of the water in Central Asia.  Water, and its by-
products such as hydroelectric power, is relatively abundant in Kyrgyzstan.  But 
Kyrgyzstan lacks other critical resources, specifically significant energy deposits like 
petroleum and natural gas, and the country must put great emphasis on securing these 
goods in its foreign and economic policy. 
2. Structural Factors 
The political system developed in Kyrgyzstan’s first decade of independence 
experienced a gradual consolidation of power within the executive branch of government.  
Kyrgyzstan is considered a republic, with formal independence from the Soviet Union 
recognized as 31 August 1991.  Until March 2005, the country had been ruled by only a 
single head of state, former President Askar Akayev.  Several referenda passed since 
1991 increased the executive’s power at the expense of the legislature.3  The Kyrgyz 
Parliament, the Jorgorku Kenesh, is currently a 75-seat unicameral legislature.  The 
President initiated several referenda since 1991 switching the parliament between 
unicameral and bicameral arrangements, intending to limit its ability to check the 
executive branch.  The judicial branch is very weak and assumed to be under the 
influence of the executive.  In sum, decision making for Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy is 
consolidated in an inner circle surrounding the President, with limited ability by the 
legislature and the population to influence foreign policy outcomes. 
Kyrgyzstan pursued genuine market reform strategies since independence, but 
remains an economically poor nation.  The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the 
loss of many of the subsidies provided to the former Soviet republic by the central 
government.  Massive de-industrialization followed, as the young country sought survival 
in the global economy.  Lacking substantial natural resources, Kyrgyzstan chose to accept 
recommendations from the West to restructure its economy.  These strategies, 
implemented and monitored with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
                                                 
3 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook 2005 - Kyrgyzstan, Available online at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kg.html  Last Accessed June 2005. 
4 
(IMF), focused on mass privatization, price liberalization, and currency reform.4  
Although the country has weathered economic restructuring and has predominantly 
achieved macroeconomic stability, the country still faces severe economic hurdles in its 
attempt to increase prosperity.  Thus, foreign policy decisions are acutely sensitive to 
economic advantages or disadvantages a particular nation might bring to Kyrgyzstan. 
The Kyrgyz military was one of the first victims to economic necessity in the 
country’s early years.  Although the country inherited a Soviet division, it was in no 
position financially to sustain its combat capability.  Additionally, several problematic 
issues plagued the new military.  The Kyrgyz military had very few of its own non-
Russian officers.  Even those officers the Kyrgyz military did inherit lacked experience at 
senior levels of the Soviet military.  The new Kyrgyz government lacked a formal 
Defense Ministry, which could advocate the needs and requirements of the military to the 
rest of government and provide focus and direction to military strategic, operational, and 
tactical thought.  Finally, the military Kyrgyzstan did inherit inadequately matched the 
threats the country would face in its first decade and a half of independence.5  The 
Kyrgyz armed forces were equipped to fight a mechanized battle in the Cold War, not an 
insurgency operation in the mountains of Central Asia.  Kyrgyzstan’s military is ill-
equipped and ill-prepared to handle the nation’s security, and the government must 
pursue foreign assistance to guarantee territorial integrity. 
3. Identity Factors 
Kyrgyzstan has multiple identities, which shape the nation’s approach and 
priorities in its foreign policy.  To begin, Kyrgyzstan is one of the most multi-ethnic 
societies in Central Asia.  The titular Kyrgyz population represents almost 65% of the 
nation’s citizens, while Uzbeks (13.8%) and Russians (12.5%) make up the predominant 
minorities in the country.  Geographically, northern Kyrgyzstan has a substantially more 
Russian presence than the south, especially in Bishkek, while the Uzbek population is  
                                                 
4 Rafis Abazov, Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan (Lanham, Maryland and Oxford: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2004), 7. 
5 William D. O’Malley and Roger N. McDermott, “Kyrgyzstan’s Security Tightrope: Balancing its 
Relations with Moscow and Washington,” U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, September 2003.  
Available online at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Kyrgystan/Kyrgystan.htm  Last accessed 
June 2005. 
5 
concentrated in the south and west of Kyrgyzstan near the Ferghana Valley.  These 
divisions often lead to considerations of a “north-south” divide in the country, which 
coincide with the predominant patronage networks in the country.   
Patronage networks in Kyrgyzstan span and overlap ethnicities, creating their own 
informal power bases.  Before the Soviets installed the party architecture, most 
inhabitants of present day Kyrgyzstan identified themselves with a tribe, extended family, 
or region, which may or may not have coincided with a particular ethnic group.6  The 
communist experience modified and in some cases reinforced these local bonds, as these 
networks became the sole way to defy the state.7  These informal ties continue to 
influence state operation, and many Kyrgyz analysts suggest that this networked political 
system suppresses the development of broader political parties.8  Although evidence to 
quantify network politics is fleeting, it is enough to infer that the networks which 
dominate Kyrgyz internal policies will also be the networks which potentially dominate 
external and foreign policies. 
Both the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks belong to the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam.  
Kyrgyz and Uzbek Muslims of southern Kyrgyzstan are considered more religious than 
their northern counterparts.9  Kyrgyzstan’s leadership possesses a genuine fear of Islamic 
fundamentalism, which the Kyrgyz label as “wahhabi” movements.  The Kyrgyz 
government often emphasizes the opposition to radical extremist and terrorist 
organizations in its interactions with foreign governments.  Ethnic Russians are 
predominantly members of the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church. 
C. THE KYRGYZ FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH 
Given the preceding framework, Kyrgyzstan pursues a self-described multi-vector 
diplomatic agenda in which it actively seeks a “flexible and balanced foreign policy.”10  
The stated goals of this policy are to secure and maintain the territorial integrity of 
                                                 
6 John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy? (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers, 1999), 39. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, 42. 
9 Abazov, Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan, 6. 
10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Kyrgyzstan in a World Community,” 
Available online at http://www.mfa.kg/index-en.php?vsection=68 Last accessed June 2005. 
6 
Kyrgyzstan, to establish a favorable environment for economic transition and democratic 
reform, and to protect the rights and liberties of Kyrgyz citizens.11  Pursuing multiple 
vectors allows Kyrgyzstan to emphasize its role as a bridge for “friendship and 
cooperation” in a region of the world heavily influenced by European (through Russia), 
Arabian-Muslim, Persian, and Chinese cultures.12  By maintaining open and prosperous 
relations with all these “vectors,” Kyrgyzstan hopes to increase its prosperity 
simultaneously with all. 
Less clear in Kyrgyzstan’s multi-vector foreign policy is whether all the vectors 
are weighted equally.  Kyrgyz diplomats would suggest not, deferring a special position 
to Russia in foreign policy matters.  The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs proudly 
states: “The ‘Eurasian civilization’ has been formed as geopolitical, economic, cultural, 
spiritual, and linguistic ground around Russia, and Kyrgyzstan belongs to the part of this 
ground.”13  The foreign policy approach stipulates that Kyrgyz interests “predetermine 
high-level political cooperation with Russia” without sacrificing its relations with other 
powers like the United States and China.14  
In the continuum of international relations, state priorities can potentially change 
over time.  It remains to be determined if Kyrgyzstan’s affinity to Russia remains as 
strong today as it was the day after in received its independence from the Soviet Union in 
1991.  What would cause a shift in the strength of each of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy 
vectors?  Is this a variable Kyrgyzstan can control?  Opportunities may arise which allow 
Kyrgyzstan to readdress its foreign policy approach.  On the other hand, these same 
opportunities might also motivate Kyrgyzstan to consolidate pre-existing arrangements.  
The terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent U.S. 
response constitutes an opportunity window, which Kyrgyzstan faced.  Did Kyrgyzstan 
use 9/11 to change its foreign policy vectors?  To answer this question necessitates an 
evaluation of Kyrgyzstan’s perceptions of its position in the international order. 
                                                 
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Kyrgyzstan in a World Community.” 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Kyrgyzstan and the Great Powers,” Available 
online at http://www.mfa.kg/index-en.php?vsection=62 Last accessed 10 June 2005. 
14 Ibid. 
7 
What Kyrgyzstan seeks to gain from its foreign policy is a function of how 
Kyrgyzstan sees the world.  In order to gauge Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy priorities and 
strategies, this study attempts to determine Kyrgyz perceptions of the international 
environment and its position within that environment.  The study uses two theoretical 
models, neorealism and neoliberalism, to help potentially explain Kyrgyz perceptions.  
To assist the measurement of Kyrgyz perceptions, the study compares the country’s 
relations with two large powers, Russia and the United States, around a significant event 
– the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  The study seeks to compare Kyrgyzstan’s 
relations with the United States with its relationship with Russia in light of 9/11, 
addressing if this significant event provided a strong enough impetus to Kyrgyzstan to 
either change its foreign policy approach or consolidate its existing strategy.  Chapter II 
presents the two theoretical models used in the evaluation and delineates a research 
design for the two case studies evaluated.  The subsequent two chapters will focus on a 
particular case.  Chapter III evaluates Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with the United States 
both before and after 9/11, while Chapter IV addresses Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with 
Russia in the same manner.  Finally, the data is assessed in Chapter V, where a reflection 
of its significance is presented.  Before evaluating Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with each of 
the powers before and after 9/11, it is necessary to establish the state of affairs within 
Kyrgyzstan at those two critical times.   
D. KYRGYZSTAN: NET ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 2001 
1. Political Situation 
As Kyrgyzstan entered its tenth year of independence in 2001, the country found 
itself facing a wide array of internal and external challenges.  2000 was a highly 
controversial year for Kyrgyz politics.  President Askar Akayev was elected to another 
five-year term as the nation’s leader, continuing to be the sole individual to occupy the 
position since the country’s independence.  Akayev’s election was widely criticized as 
being illegitimate, with multiple claims of voter manipulation and obstruction of 
opposition parties and candidates.  The most notorious example was the arrest, 
incarceration, and eventual trial of Akayev’s primary opponent, Feliks Kulov.  Kulov was 
found guilty of corruption charges, which allegedly took place earlier in his career when 
he served as head of Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Service. 
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The 2000 parliamentary elections were also criticized by the international 
community as being less than free and fair.  These elections took place on the heels of 
several referenda designed by Akayev to strengthen the power of the executive at the 
expense of the legislature.15  Akayev’s appointed election committee banned the most 
legitimate opposition parties on a wide range of technicalities.  By early 2001, Akayev 
was still supremely in control and able to pursue his agenda without serious opposition 
from either a political challenger or from Parliamentary pressure or oversight.  The U.S. 
non-governmental organization Freedom House charted Kyrgyzstan’s slide from its 
progressive image, ranking the country in 2000 with a “6” in political rights and a “5” in 
civil liberties, each on a scale of 1 for most free and 7 for least free.  Overall, the country 
was considered “not free.”16 
2. Economic Situation 
By early 2001, Kyrgyzstan was just beginning to recover from a strong economic 
downturn associated with Russia’s 1998 economic crisis.  Kyrgyzstan’s per capita GDP 
for 2000 was $2700 with a 5.7% growth rate for the same year.  Inflation for 2000 was at 
18.7%.17  Agriculture was the principal revenue generator, comprising 34.2% of the GDP 
structure, followed by services (31.8%) and industry (23.3%).18  Kyrgyzstan exported 
$503.8 million worth of goods in 2000, up from 1999’s U.S. $454 million but still shy of 
1997’s peak of U.S. $609.5 million.  Kyrgyz products were principally exported to 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.  Kyrgyzstan imported U.S. $555 
million in goods in 2000, down from 1999’s U.S. $610.5 million and further from 1998’s 
U.S. $841.1 million.19  2000 marked Kyrgyzstan’s second full year as a member of the 
World Trade Organization. 
                                                 
15 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the ‘Island of Democracy,” ICG 
Asia Report No. 22, 8. 
16 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Country Ratings.” Spreadsheet available online at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls  Last accessed June 2005. 
17 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2001 (Washington D.C.: Imaging & Publishing 
Support, 2001), 281. 
18 U.S. Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS), “Rethinking 
Eurasia: Spotlight on Russia’s Siberia & Urals and the Kyrgyz Republic,” BISNIS Outreach Presentation, 
July 2004, slide 4.  Online at http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/presentation_jul04_kyrgyzstan.ppt 
Last accessed May 2005.  
19 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington D.C.: IMF 
Publication Services, 2004), 290. 
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3. Security Situation 
Kyrgyzstan’s security dilemma became readily apparent by the beginning of 
2001.  Both in 1999 and 2000, Kyrgyzstan was subject to a series of raids by members of 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  The 1999 IMU invasion was led by Juma 
Namangani and was purportedly intended as an attempt to create an insurgent stronghold 
in southern Kyrgyzstan from which to launch subsequent attacks into Uzbekistan.  In the 
process, the insurgents took several hostages in both campaigns as well as overrunning 
several villages.  Both incursions were eventually repelled by Kyrgyz and Uzbek forces 
over a period of weeks. 
These attacks highlighted the inadequacy of Kyrgyzstan’s military and security 
forces.  At the time of the 1999 attacks, Kyrgyzstan only had 10,000 troops in uniform, 
with another approximately 5,000 in the border service.  The Kyrgyz border guards had 
just taken responsibility for the defense and patrol of Kyrgyz borders from Russian forces 
in 1999.  The Kyrgyz air arm was practically negligible, and the entire Kyrgyz military 
was ill-prepared to fight insurgencies.  Given the potential of continued extremist 
incursions and the limited capability of Kyrgyzstan to address this threat, the country 
needed to look elsewhere to seek security support. 
E. KYRGYZSTAN: NET ASSESSMENT, MAY 2005 
1. Political Situation 
By May 2005, the political situation in Kyrgyzstan had changed significantly.  As 
early as 2002, President Akayev’s rule over Kyrgyzstan had become fragile.  A shooting 
during a public protest in Aksy by Kyrgyz security forces left six civilians dead and 
resulted in multiple calls for Akayev’s resignation.  Although Akayev tried to calm the 
situation by removing his Prime Minister and forcing the government to resign, he 
refused to step down himself.  Akayev’s term as president was set to expire in 2005.  
Although he publicly stated he had no intention to seek another term in office, many 
analysts believed he would either change his mind or pass off the presidency to a member 
of his inner circle.  Media freedoms continued to deteriorate, and Akayev’s two main 
political opponents continued to remain in prison.   
The February and March 2005 elections would provide the spark leading to 
Akayev’s ouster.  Of the 75 seats being contested for the Kyrgyz parliament, only ten 
10 
percent were won by opposition candidates.  Allegations of fraud, election manipulation, 
and nepotism rang throughout Kyrgyzstan, and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) cited several irregularities in the election process.20  
During the second round of parliamentary elections, opposition candidates again failed to 
overcome Akayev and his party’s grip on the political situation, causing protestors to 
storm several government buildings in southern Kyrgyzstan.  Protests would spread to the 
capital Bishkek in the following days, with angry crowds eventually overrunning the 
Kyrgyz White House.21  President Akayev hastily fled the country during the melee, 
seeking asylum in Russia.  An interim government was formed after Akayev’s departure, 
with Kurmanbek Bakiev leading the country as acting President and Prime Minister.  The 
contested parliament was sworn into office, and President Akayev formally resigned on 4 
April 2005.  Presidential elections were moved forward to 10 July 2005.   
2. Economic Situation 
Kyrgyzstan continued another year of modest but consistent economic growth in 
2004.  Kyrgyzstan’s per capita GDP for 2004 was down to $1700 with a 6.0% growth 
rate for the same year.  Inflation rates were significantly down since 2000, stabilizing at 
3.2%.22  Agriculture still generated significant revenue for Kyrgyzstan, comprising 
38.5% of the GDP structure, sharing the lead with services at 38.7%.  Industrial 
contribution to GDP fell slightly to 22.8% of the economy.23  Kyrgyzstan’s estimated 
exports for 2004 were U.S. $646.7 million, an increase since 2000.  Imports also 
increased since 2000, with 2004 estimates at U.S. $775.1 million for 2004. 
3. Security Situation 
From a security perspective, Kyrgyzstan found itself on the world stage as a 
contributor to the U.S.-led Global War on Terror.  Kyrgyzstan was quick to lend 
assistance to the United States after the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York City 
and Washington, D.C.  It offered its international airport as an airbase for operations in 
                                                 
20 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) International Election Observation 
Mission, “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” Parliamentary Elections, The Kyrgyz 
Republic, 27 February 2005.  Online at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/02/4334_en.pdf  Last 
accessed June 2005. 
21 Jim Nichol, “Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and Implications,” Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) for Congress RL 32864, 14 April 2005, 2. 
22 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2005 – Kyrgyzstan.  
23 BISNIS outreach briefing, slide 4. 
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Afghanistan.  Following the establishment of the Coalition airbase at Manas, Kyrgyzstan 
also offered an airbase to the Russian Air Force as part of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) in 2003.  Kyrgyzstan was in the unique position of hosting 
deployed forces of two former enemies, the United States and Russia, with the two 
airbases only 30 km from one another. 
Whether these deployments provided real or perceived security for Kyrgyzstan, 
the fact is that the likelihood of extremist incursions like those of 1999 and 2000 was 
significantly diminished by 2005.  Although isolated terrorist attacks had occurred since 
2001, no major extremist operations had been undertaken.  Kyrgyz security forces were 
still closely tracking the activities of the IMU, which had taken significant losses to its 
membership through its contribution to the Taliban’s resistance to U.S. attacks.24  
Kyrgyzstan had begun to pay more attention since 2001 to the rise of the Islamic group 
Hizb ut-Tahir (HT), whose advocacy for an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia disturbed 
Kyrgyz leaders.  Although HT allegedly promotes non-violent means, there had been 
multiple instances of Kyrgyz security forces apprehending and arresting HT members on 
anti-extremist grounds.   
Finally, Afghanistan did continue to be considered a security threat because of 
reinvigorated opium production and distribution following the fall of the Taliban.  Opium 
production in Afghanistan had a banner year in 2004, simultaneous to a crackdown on 
distribution through Iran.  To compensate, narcotics traffickers are taking advantage of 
Kyrgyzstan’s proximity to Tajikistan and of the northern route eventually leading to 
Russia and west Europe, thriving off the rugged terrain in the country, which is 
advantageous to law enforcement avoidance.  Despite U.S. and European interest to 
address this problem, most analysts predict that current Afghan production levels will 
stay consistent in the short-term. 
Before applying these two net assessments to the rest of the data collection, it is 
first necessary to present the theoretical models to be used in the study and to chart out 
how data will be collected to assist in the research. 
                                                 
24 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for 
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II. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF KYRGYZ FOREIGN 
POLICY BEHAVIOR WITH GREAT POWERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study seeks to evaluate Kyrgyz foreign policy behavior toward Russia and 
the United States after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.  How can Kyrgyzstan 
manage complex foreign policies with multiple large powers simultaneously, and has 
9/11 changed the dynamic of these engagements?  What do rational Kyrgyz decision-
makers consider when committing themselves to a specific engagement strategy with a 
power such as the United States or Russia?  In practical terms, is Kyrgyzstan being 
opportunistic, or is it motivated by larger issues and longer-term strategies?  These are 
questions of small state behavior, and this study’s overarching goal is to contribute to a 
framework for explaining foreign policy choices by weak states regarding great powers. 
Inquiring into the logic, perceptions, and realities of small states helps U.S. 
policy-makers formulate their own strategies.  If the Global War on Terror is truly global, 
then the United States must expect continual interaction with small states during the 
execution of its campaign.  Gaining insight to long-term motivations, interests, and 
allegiances helps frame the nature and potential strategies of small state leaders, allowing 
U.S. decision makers to take realistic approaches when cooperating with small states.  It 
is in the United States’ best interest to accurately evaluate small state intentions, for such 
insight helps prevent unwise engagements.  Additionally, careful evaluation into small 
states’ goals and long-term inclinations potentially helps keep U.S. expectations from 
exceeding the small state’s capability to meet them.   
Are small states as weak as they appear, and do they have any influence in their 
interaction with large states?  This is a question of power or lack there of, and different 
theoretical approaches suggest different outcomes for small states in the international 
order.  Determining how Kyrgyzstan perceives its world, then, will help us evaluate 
specific small state policies.  A particular policy will reflect the perceived options 
available.  The major theoretical models considered are neorealism and neoliberalism.  
Each offers a different argument of where the small state fits, and each offers different 
strategies for small states based on their position in the international community. 
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B. NEOREALIST EXPLANATIONS OF SMALL STATE BEHAVIOR 
1. Neorealism and Balance of Power Theories 
Neorealists view the international system as a decentralized and anarchic 
environment where a constant state of war or preparation for it characterizes the 
interaction of the units.25  This Hobbesian propensity for international conflict, or the 
never-ending fear of it, frames all relationships in the international arena since no higher 
ruling authority exists to protect individual states.26  This anarchy motivates the units 
within the system, states, to survive through self-help strategies – they are on their own to 
provide for their security.27  
Kenneth Waltz argues that the international system revolves around states because 
the state survives as the principal actor within the system.  All states, though, are not 
created equal.  Neorealism contends that states function alike, as they perform similar 
tasks to one another.  In particular, all states, large and small, are concerned above all for 
their security.  Survival is the critical and preeminent task of a state’s agenda, always a 
precondition to pursuing further goals.28  State capacity to address its security needs, 
though, varies.  The ability of one state to sufficiently provide for its own security will 
rest on the state’s power. 
Neorealists focus on power, struggle and accommodation in their evaluation of 
the international environment.29  Waltz argues that within the system a finite distribution 
of capability exists among the states.  Thus relative capabilities differentiate the strong 
from the weak, as powerful states become the major actors in the entire system.30  The 
implication for smaller states is immense.  Small states by definition do not possess the 
same power capacity that strong states do.  Small states must choose appropriate survival 
strategies which consider the constraining effects of the system, which in turn revolves 
around the interactions of strong powers.   
                                                 
25 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), 88.  
26 Ibid., 103-104. 
27 Ibid., 104. 
28 Ibid., 91. 
29 Ibid., 113. 
30 Ibid., 94. 
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Small states are considered weak since they lack the material power inherent in 
strong states.  Weak states must address their security in a world where force is the 
principal language spoken, for the capability and the willingness to use force gives the 
strong state its power.  Waltz emphasizes that the omnipresent capability to use force is 
what gives power its leverage, not the actual use of military power.31  Through the 
distribution of capabilities, only the great powers possess the force capability to exert 
leverage, and this leverage becomes the power which great states own and weak states do 
not.  As Waltz relates, “ …an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more 
than they affect him.  The weak understand this; the strong do not.”32  
Weakness can be a double-edged sword.  Neorealists contend weak state behavior 
is constrained not by deferential respect to a stronger state’s “rightfulness of rule,” but 
rather by a rational decision not to provoke a larger state with a superior power 
advantage.33  On the other hand, Waltz also suggests that truly weak states might enjoy 
some freedom of maneuver since strong states are little concerned with the negligible 
impact of a weak state on the international order.34  This highlights just how marginal 
weak states are considered in the neorealist international order.  Small states, however, do 
interact with larger powers in a neorealist world and neorealists find explanations of these 
interactions problematic. 
Evaluating Kyrgyz behavior as a small state engaging a larger power such as 
Russia or the United States must include the nature of interaction between the parties.  
Given an unequal distribution of power among states at the systemic level, neorealists 
predominantly emphasize interactions among and between great powers.  Great powers 
may at times cooperate with small states.  This cooperation, however, is solely based on 
the necessities of security and survival and will only last as long as is necessary to 
achieve the desired security effect.  The structure of the system limits cooperation  
                                                 
31 Waltz, Theory of International Politics 191.  
32 Ibid., 192. 
33 Ibid., 113. 
34 Ibid. 
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between states since a state must consistently seek to protect itself in a self-help system 
while simultaneously avoiding becoming excessively reliant on another state’s goods, 
services, and power capabilities through cooperation.35   
Waltz feels larger states might pursue some cooperative agreements, but would 
not willingly place themselves in dependent situations.  Small states, on the other hand, 
might be forced into highly dependent engagements with larger powers even though the 
costs of such an engagement are excessively high.36  High interdependence equals high 
vulnerability and this is to be avoided at all costs.37   
For realists, the question of inequalities is embedded in the definition of 
interdependence, since certain relationships contain various mixtures of dependence for 
some nations and independence for others.38  This unequal distribution of capability leads 
to various levels of choice: some nations have great ability to make alternate choices, 
others do not.  Unsurprisingly, neorealists believe great powers have the luxury of choice; 
weak states do not.  The more dependent a state is on another, the less leverage it has to 
influence the relationship.39  Weak states in the neorealist world lack the weight to 
manipulate relationships with great powers and are often cornered into uneven 
relationships to guarantee their survival while lacking the ability to change the 
agreement.  
Kenneth Waltz in the end ignores and marginalizes small states in the 
international order.  His quintessential balance of power theory revolves around the great 
states, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of large and small numbered 
systems.  He consistently reminds the reader that his propositions focus on international 
politics and not on foreign policies.  Since his debate revolves around great powers, 
Waltz can only set the framework for small states to seek their survival.  Other neorealist 
authors, in turn, continue the debate and provide better explanations of small state 
behavior. 
                                                 
35 Waltz, Theory of International Politics 106. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 153. 
39 Ibid. 
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2. Bandwagoning Behavior  
Stephen Walt’s principal contribution to neorealist theory is his proposition that 
states base their alliance choice on perceived threats rather than power.  In addition to 
new considerations of threat perception, Walt also offers several explanations of small 
state behavior in a neorealist order.  All states, large and small, weigh variations of 
another state’s aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions 
when choosing their allies.40  Walt believes states will predominantly balance against the 
most threatening power based on these four sources of threat.  Some states, though, 
pursue bandwagoning strategies and Walt feels weak states are the predominant 
bandwagon candidates.   
Three principal reasons force states to bandwagon, and Walt explicitly considers 
these to be small and weak state characteristics.  First, a small state is simply more 
vulnerable to the pressure and power of a larger power and the capability it could add to 
either side would be negligible.  If a state’s contribution is unlikely to influence the 
outcome of a stand-off between two other powers, it is more likely to pick the winning 
side.41  Second, weak states in particular are inclined to bandwagon if no other alternative 
exists.  Aligning with the most threatening state might be the only choice if national 
survival is at stake and no other external support is available.42  Finally, small and weak 
states are likely to bandwagon if a threatening great power is geographically proximate 
since the weak state views itself as the first to bear the brunt of an attack.  Walt argues 
that these bandwagoning traits contribute to “sphere of influence” environments where 
small states rationally weigh their options in the face of a great power with an inclination 
to use its influence.43  They choose to bandwagon rather than face possible occupation or 
annexation.  Walt’s propositions help when evaluating small state behavior at the 
systemic level.  Some neorealists, though, consider sub-systemic factors, which might 
influence small state behavior as well. 
 
                                                 
40 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 
Vol. 9 No. 4 (Spring 1985), 8. 
41 Ibid., 17. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 11. 
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3. Omnibalancing 
A final neorealist approach applicable to the study of small state behavior toward 
large powers attempts to incorporate both domestic and systemic factors.  Steven David 
offers a theory of omnibalancing specifically addressing Third World alignment trends at 
the end of the Cold War.  Although David’s theory still rests on the assumption that 
threats will be resisted, he suggests that Third World leaders will counter all threats, both 
external and internal.  David puts state survival first, but suggests that personal survival 
of Third World leaders matters too. 
Expanding on his approach, David presents three avenues a developing state’s 
leader might use when interacting with a great power.  First, the leader could appease 
secondary external adversaries so he could focus on a primary external adversary just as a 
developed state would (align with one threat to balancing against another more pressing 
external threat).  Next, Third World leaders could appease international allies of domestic 
minorities within their territory (external balancing against an internal threat).  David 
characterizes this as balancing, as aligning with the external power offsets the immediate 
threat of an internal challenge.  Finally, David suggests that Third World leaders may 
protect themselves against both external and internal threats at the expense of the state 
(external balancing for elite survival).  Such alignment with the large state helps keep the 
leader in power, ensuring personal survival.44 
David’s inclusion of domestic factors into the small state decision making process 
is particularly insightful.  Third World countries are often formed from colonial and 
imperial possessions, leaving the surviving nation-state with an artificially constructed 
mix of sub-national groups with conflicting interests.45  Persistent authoritarian regimes 
and illegitimate governments amplify divisions within the state, and ensuing challenges 
to power emerge from within.46  Finally, a lack of popular mandate suggests a limited 
elite group is making foreign policy decisions for the state.  Given the choice of a 
                                                 
44 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 
1991), 235-236. 
45 Ibid., 239. 
46 Ibid. 
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strategic decision bad for the state but good for elite power consolidation versus one good 
for the state but detrimental for their hold on power, elites will often choose the former.47   
In sum, small states must walk precariously in a neorealist world.  Most neorealist 
proponents agree that the international order centers on great powers. Small states 
maneuver, in turn, in response to or in relation with these great powers.  Small states 
must focus on their survival given this anarchic environment, with several potential 
approaches available to the state.  Common neorealist explanations of small state 
behavior include traditional balance of power and bandwagon outcomes, or balancing 
against both external and internal threats.  Whichever strategy chosen, survival is the 
predominant task.  Power remains outside of the small states reach. 
C. NEOLIBERAL EXPLANATIONS OF SMALL STATE BEHAVIOR 
1. Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism offers an alternative framework powerful enough to address small 
state behavior with great powers.  To begin with, neoliberal institutional theories are 
congruent with realism on several key issues.  Neoliberal proponents consider states the 
primary international actor just as realists do, agreeing that they operate as unitary-
rational actors in an anarchic order.48  Neoliberal institutionalism however chides 
realism’s pessimistic outlook on international cooperation, focusing rather on the 
potential for states to work together.49  Neoliberals emphasize, through game theory and 
prisoner dilemma interactions, that conditional cooperation is more likely to occur if 
interactions are highly iterative; for states, multiple mutual interactions reinforce 
cooperation as the best long-term strategy.50  Additionally, neoliberals break from realists 
over the primacy of security in the international order, providing a more optimistic 
framework for states to interact.   
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that, given sufficient interdependence 
among most states, an international environment not necessarily dominated by security as 
                                                 
47 David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” 243. 
48 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin, 
ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 121. 
49 Ibid., 122. 
50 Ibid. 
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the pre-eminent agenda item could emerge.51  This does not mean that security is never 
discussed in state interactions.  Rather, they believe security’s role is contingent upon the 
degree and nature of interdependence among states and that at certain times other issues 
can prove to be the focal point between two states.52  In turn, an international 
environment not dominated by security concerns leads to state interactions without the 
threat of military force constraining the relationship.  In a densely interdependent 
environment where traditional “high” politics are deemphasized in relation to “low” 
political issues such as economics or ecological disputes, military power loses its 
fungibility.53  The actual use of military force by one side in these interdependent 
relationships would be so detrimental to the overall relationship that the costs would 
exceed any potential gain.   
Neoliberals do not necessarily sideline military power and security.  If a state 
finds itself in an extreme security dilemma, the military option might be the expected 
outcome.  Keohane and Nye emphasize, though, that among advanced industrial 
countries this is unlikely.54  Less clear is if this is also true for developing countries.  One 
purpose of this study is to address if non-industrial countries can also live in a world 
where high politics are deemphasized.  Additionally, this is not to say that conflict and 
dispute have been eliminated between states.  Rather, Keohane and Nye suggest that the 
origins of one state’s influence over the next exist primarily outside the military 
spectrum, and such resources as economic capabilities are used to settle the conflicts that 
are expected to arise.  To show how power can be obtained by non-military means, 
Keohane and Nye propose alternative definitions of sensitivity and vulnerability, arguing 
that power and influence from state to state can come from the nature of the relationship 
itself. 
2. Sensitivity, Vulnerability, and Power 
Power is a function of sensitivity and vulnerability, and each characteristic 
focuses on a state’s capacity to respond to changes in a relationship.  Keohane and Nye 
                                                 
51 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 25. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 27. 
54 Ibid., 27. 
21 
define sensitivity as the “degree of responsiveness within a policy framework.”55  A 
state’s sensitivity to an issue depends on how quickly changes by an external source 
impact the state, in addition to the magnitude of the costs of such changes.  A critical 
assumption regarding sensitivity is that the nature of the relationship between states does 
not change and, principally, concerns shorter timeframes.56  If the state is immediately 
influenced by policy changes from another actor, the state is considered sensitive on that 
issue of interdependence.  Whereas sensitivity impacts states in the short term, 
vulnerability impacts states in the long term. 
Whether an interdependent relationship entails vulnerability depends on the 
state’s ability to formulate alternative policy plans and the costs associated there with.57  
With sensitivity, the state suffers costly ramifications from changes in the other state’s 
behavior, and these are measured immediately, before the affected state could respond in 
kind with a counter-policy.  With vulnerability, the state suffers costly effects even after 
it implements a policy change indicating a deeper liability to that relationship.  Policy 
changes often take a substantial amount of time to bear fruit.  But if they are effective in 
decreasing the costs and speed with which external changes affect the state, then the state 
is not vulnerable; it is merely sensitive.  However, if the state is vulnerable it will 
continue to pay costs whenever the other state takes an adverse action regardless of the 
policy changes it adopts.  Additionally, Keohane and Nye believe it is not just the costs 
itself which makes a particular relationship one of vulnerability, but also the political will 
to bear those costs.58  If one state is vulnerable to the next on a particular issue, it will 
have to force itself to the other state’s “rules of the game” by opening itself up to an 
asymmetrical relationship.  Power, thus, emerges from these asymmetrical 
relationships.59 
Keohane and Nye prioritize vulnerability over sensitivity when evaluating an 
interdependent relationship, but both are necessary for an evaluation of a small state – 
                                                 
55 Keohane and Nye, 12.   
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 13. 
58 Ibid., 15. 
59 Ibid. 
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great power relationship.60  Sensitivity on its own is insufficient to evaluate the nature of 
the interdependent relations at a given time, failing to point to the long-term implications 
of a given relationship, which an assessment of vulnerability allows.  If evaluated over 
multiple periods of time, though, sensitivity levels might give clues to more engrained 
vulnerability trends.  
Vulnerability is bad for all states, small and large.  Since neoliberals contend that 
asymmetrical interdependencies are the source of power, they agree with realists that all 
states should try to decrease the burden of asymmetrical relationships in order to 
minimize vulnerability.  For our discussion, one small state, Kyrgyzstan, potentially has 
at its disposal sources of power not available in a realist world when dealing with two 
great powers, the United States and Russia.  Of course, this assumes that Kyrgyzstan has 
something the great powers want.  This assumption will be empirically investigated 
below. 
Neoliberal explanations of small state behavior suggest that these states might 
have more room to maneuver with large powers than the realist world allows.  Since 
power revolves around asymmetrical interdependencies rather than military strength, 
small states have potentially the same tools at their disposal as the large powers when 
negotiating and managing relationships.  If the small state, through an asymmetrical 
relationship, maintains a superior position on a particular issue, it can use this position as 
leverage when pursuing policy goals.  The limitations of this strategy for small states, 
though, are the same as for large states.  The power derived from an asymmetrical 
interdependency only goes as far as the specific issue area involved.  Whether a state can 
maximize its overall position with another state by leveraging its comparative advantage 
on a particular issue depends on the intensity of the asymmetrical interdependency and 
the nature of the relationship. 61  A state which is weak in a particular issue might try to 
link that issue to one in which the state is stronger.62  The opposite (larger) state, though, 
must have a reason it commits itself to an asymmetrical-disadvantaged relationship with a 
                                                 
60 Keohane and Nye, 15. 
61 Neoliberalism believes that states, although the primary actor, are not the only actor and that 
transnational and nongovernmental actors can also interact with states, or each other. See Keohane and 
Nye, 24-26. 
62 Keohane and Nye, 31. 
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small state.  The larger state might be in a position where no other actor could provide 
such goods or services, thus remaining susceptible to issue linkage and vulnerable to the 
relationship. 
3. Complex Interdependence 
An evaluation of interdependency should be held up against an ideal type to 
provide a relative picture of its depth.  Keohane and Nye paint a world with two opposite 
ideal type environments at the ends of a spectrum.  On one side is realism, where high 
politics reign as states maneuver in competition with one another, usually in war.63  At 
the other end of the spectrum is their own ideal type – complex interdependence – 
characterized by factors alien to realists.  The complex interdependence world involves 
multiple channels of interaction at levels below the state, including transnational-type 
interactions.  In this complex interdependence world, war is not the primary interaction 
among states, and Keohane and Nye suggest that at any given time there is no hierarchy 
of interests.  Additionally, military force is not used by governments on one another in a 
complex interdependence world since the ramifications of such use would be cost-
prohibitive.64 
From the small state’s viewpoint, this is a much better world to live in since 
military force is deemphasized and other avenues of interaction are available.  Keohane 
and Nye suggest a unique political process coincides with the complex interdependent 
world, one which offers the small state avenues for potentially influencing its interaction 
with both single and multiple great powers.  Issue linkage, as already described, is not the 
only strategy available to states in an interdependent relationship.  The use of 
international organizations is especially important for small states to advance their 
cause.65  Agenda setting in such fora also allows states to introduce issues, which would 
not have been able to be prioritized on purely bilateral levels in a realist world dictated by 
military power asymmetries.  Although complex interdependence is an ideal type, it is  
                                                 
63 Keohane and Nye, 24. 
64 Ibid., 25. 
65 Ibid., 31. 
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still a useful benchmark to compare the web of interdependencies encapsulating the small 
state.  These interdependencies allow a broader evaluation of the vulnerabilities and 
leverage a small state faces. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN  
1. Introduction 
Both neorealism and neoliberalism have possible explanations for Kyrgyz 
behavior with Russia and the United States, and both potentially might be able to provide 
insight to current and future concerns of the Kyrgyz leadership.  Keohane and Nye 
suggest that a realist ideal-type world exists opposite of their complex interdependence 
type environment, and admit few specific cases in the international order fit perfectly at 
either extreme.  Most situations, they believe, lie somewhere in between.  Aside from an 
equally theoretical perfect middle point between realism and complex interdependence, 
specific outcomes could favor either one or the other models when analyzed.  
Determining where Kyrgyzstan finds itself on this scale helps us determine how 
Kyrgyzstan interprets reality.  Knowing Kyrgyz perceptions of reality, in turn, helps us 
predict future Kyrgyz policy inclinations.66  Quite simply, we want to know how Kyrgyz 
policy makers rationally choose engagement strategies and preferred outcomes based on 
realistic perceptions.  Knowing this will help U.S. policy makers arm themselves with 
appropriate long-term strategies in Central Asia tailored to the nuances of Kyrgyz 
behavior. 
Since this study focuses on a particular small state’s behavior with larger states, 
we can focus on characteristics, which might highlight Kyrgyz perceptions of reality.  
Behavior which suggests that Kyrgyzstan finds itself in a realist world include tendencies 
to balance against powers or threats as Waltz or Walt advocate respectively, or possibly 
bandwagon as Walt believes small states do.  Finally, indications that Kyrgyzstan is 
balancing against both internal and external threats, or that elite survival is paramount 
when choosing alliances, indicates behavior commensurate with David’s omnibalancing. 
On the other hand, Kyrgyz behavior which deemphasizes security and military 
force while highlighting multiple interaction channels within elements of both                                                  
66 It is possible that behavior seen by a particular state might not equate to the articulated threat 
perception.  Nonetheless, an evaluation of these perceptions still assists our understanding of the exigencies 
of small state foreign policy behavior. 
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Kyrgyzstan and the great powers suggests characteristics of Keohane and Nye’s complex 
interdependence world.  Related strategies include Kyrgyz tendencies to link agenda 
items to maximize leverage of issue areas of strength like geography to Kyrgyz weak 
areas like economics.  Now that it has been determined what indicates a particular reality, 
the next task is to measure how Kyrgyzstan perceives its reality. 
2. Vulnerability and Sensitivity Assessment 
Both realism and complex interdependence agree that vulnerabilities are bad, 
regardless of the peculiarities of each model’s definition of the word.  The difference 
between the two deals with a small state’s capacity to deal with vulnerability.  Realist 
outcomes preordain small and weak states to certain vulnerabilities with large powers, 
limiting decisions to those prioritizing security.  Complex interdependence outcomes 
allow all states, including small ones, to fight vulnerabilities through the strategies 
inherent in neoliberal approaches, centered on the comparative advantages of the state 
within particular issues.  Evaluating how Kyrgyzstan handles its vulnerabilities helps us 
assess the nature of Kyrgyz perceptions and, in turn, help us gauge the inclinations of 
future Kyrgyz policy choices.  How Kyrgyzstan handles vulnerability, though, is not a 
static assessment.  Rather, this entails an evaluation of the Kyrgyz relationship with 
larger powers over time to see if changes in vulnerability occurred and whether any 
behavior can be deduced from such changes in vulnerability.   
To simply evaluate changes in Kyrgyz vulnerability with a single large power 
limits our ability to evaluate the dynamics between multiple units.  Thus, this study 
focuses on Kyrgyz vulnerabilities with two of the largest states it interacts with – the 
United States and Russia.  The research will utilize a cross-case approach evaluating 
Kyrgyz vulnerabilities with great powers.  “Great Power,” it must be emphasized, is from 
Kyrgyzstan’s perspective.  Each of these nations brings a unique and powerful 
combination of geopolitical, economic, and security capabilities unmatched by regional 
countries like Iran or Turkey or neighbors such as Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan.  China 
would qualify as an additional test case, but is being withheld to limit the study’s scope.  
A major assumption in this paper is that NATO policy toward Kyrgyzstan is congruent 
with U.S. policy, since the United States has predominantly handled negotiations 
concerning NATO involvement.   
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Measuring vulnerability is problematic since vulnerability is a long-term 
evaluation, measurable only after a policy change has been implemented.  To aid in 
evaluating vulnerability, this paper will measure and compare levels of sensitivity at two 
points in time, ultimately using changes in sensitivity in a relationship as an indicator of 
changes in vulnerability over time.  The two snapshots will capture Kyrgyzstan’s 
sensitivity with each of the great powers, and a comparison of the two will offer insight 
to vulnerability changes.  Since the study revolves around the extent of Kyrgyz 
vulnerability, a domestic policy change must be present in response to an external 
stimulus in order to evaluate the long-term nature of Kyrgyz interdependence on that 
issue.  Thus quantified in simplest terms, this study will attempt to measure the impact of 
Kyrgyzstan’s embrace of increased U.S. engagement in Kyrgyzstan on Kyrgyz 
interdependence with great powers such as Russia (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Research Causal Chain 
 
The policy change in question is Kyrgyz acceptance of increased U.S. 
engagement efforts after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.  The Kyrgyz 
government, under President Askar Akayev, methodically chose to accept both an 
increased U.S. engagement strategy as well as hosting U.S. and coalition forces for 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  This decision altered the traditional framework in the 
region between Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and to a certain extent China, as the United States 
joined the other regional powers with a strong interest in Central Asia.   
The two snapshot dates for sensitivity evaluation will be 1 January 2001 and 31 
May 2005.  Although Kyrgyzstan did not authorize U.S. forces to deploy to Manas 
airport until December 2001, January 2001 allows for a clean separation between the pre- 
and post-9/11 timeframes.  The difference in sensitivity levels between 1 January 2001 
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and 10 September 2001 is expected to be negligible, and using 1 January allows for a 
convenient end to the calendar year, potentially simplifying data interpretation for 
annual-type statistics.  The four-year, five-month timeframe is chosen to allow enough 
time for policy changes to take place and includes any U.S. or Russian factors in recent 
Kyrgyz internal unrest.  The long-term impact of President Akayev’s departure is 
important, and congruencies or variations in Kyrgyz policy are of great interest to U.S. 
policy makers. 
The independent variable, U.S. engagement, is defined in this paper as any 
diplomatic, economic, or military effort that the United States promoted to improve its 
relations with Kyrgyzstan in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.  The 
dependent variable, Kyrgyz vulnerability with great powers, will be measured by either 
increased or decreased changes in vulnerability levels.  Vulnerability levels could also 
remain constant. Since vulnerabilities are temporal, sensitivity levels will be measured, 
compared, and evaluated as a potential indicator of vulnerability change. 
 Measuring sensitivity will be done by evaluating the Kyrgyz cost-benefit 
calculation when deciding on a particular relationship with great powers.  Costs are best 
thought as costs to break the relationship.  Thus, changes in Kyrgyz sensitivities to Russia 
and the United States will be measured by increased, decreased, or stable Kyrgyz costs, 
evaluated as part of a cost-benefit calculation.  Evaluating multiple sensitivities will help 
explain changes in vulnerabilities.  The cost-benefit calculation, of course, is a matter of 
choice by the Kyrgyz decision-maker.  To measure the cost-benefit calculation by 
Kyrgyz decision-makers, primary and secondary sources will be reviewed and assessed.  
These include interviews with policy-makers in both Washington D.C. and Kyrgyzstan, 
as well as public interviews, news reports, and official statements by Kyrgyz officials.  
When particular Kyrgyz or Russian perspectives are unavailable, then the insights of both 
Kyrgyz and U.S. academics and policy makers are used, relying on those with a strong 
working knowledge of Kyrgyz affairs. 
3. Small State Cost-Benefit Calculation 
The balance between payoffs and costs arising from a small state’s foreign policy 
choice is critical to our focus on Kyrgyz strategy with great powers.  The primary motive 
for a state in its relationship with another is the potential payoff from that relationship, 
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especially for small states whose needs often outweigh their capabilities to fill them.  
Both neorealists as neoliberals agree on this point.  At the most basic level, potential net 
benefits drive foreign policy choice (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Small State Decision (General) 
 
Small states can pursue multiple types of benefits (see Figure 3).  Although 
security dilemmas are commonly used as a threshold for state needs, this study will 
expand potential benefits by including non-security measures.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Individual Weak State Benefits Influencing Foreign Policy Choice 
 
For our purposes, three benefit dimensions will be addressed to allow for the widest 
range of interdependence avenues between the small state and the great power.  Potential 
benefits will be subdivided into security (internal and external), economic and political 
benefits. 
29 
Given that the benefits of interdependence stem from multiple dimensions, 
theoretically the combined dimensions will collectively make up the small state’s foreign 
policy choice for choosing a relationship with a great power (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.   Summation of Small State Benefits Influencing Foreign Policy Choice 
 
The three dimensions of benefits are unlikely to be evenly valued in the equation, 
and at any given time a single security, economic, or political advantage gained in an 
interdependent relationship can outweigh the other two dimensions’ contribution.  Thus, 
the final determination considers not only individual advantages of particular dimensions, 
but also there rank among one another (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5.   Summation of Small State Benefits (weighted) Influencing Foreign Policy 
Choice 
 
Any interdependent relationship, by definition, comes at some cost.  With small 
states, the expectation is that the relationship will be asymmetrical.  As Keohane and Nye 
note, though, “…it is impossible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a relationship 
will exceed the costs.”67  Thus, costs have to be evaluated in addition to benefits.  As 
elucidated, costs are best thought as costs to break the relationship.  These costs could 
include the potential termination of the benefit.  For example, if great power x takes away 
a particular benefit, weak state y would be affected because of z.  Additionally, costs 
                                                 
67 Keohane and Nye, 9. 
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could include influence attempted and justified by the great power as a result of the 
benefit the small state receives.  As with benefits, there are multiple channels of costs 
which small states must consider when evaluating the total negative side of a cost-benefit 
calculation.  Also, like benefits, the costs endured from an individual dimension might be 
more acute than costs from other dimensions of the relationship.  This evaluation will 
focus on security (CS), economic (CE), and political costs (CP) associated with a given 
interdependent relationship, weighted according to their potential impact or excessive 
reliance (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6.   Summation of Small State Costs (weighted) Influencing Foreign Policy 
Choice 
 
Thus, a decision by a small state to enter an interdependent relationship must 
weigh both the costs and the benefits prior to making a final foreign policy choice (see 
Figure 7).  Foreign policy choices carry implications, and the critical implication for this 
study is that sensitivity is present in situations where the costs exceed the benefits.   
 
 
Figure 7.   Total Cost-Benefit Calculation on Foreign Policy Choice 
 
4. Data Measurement 
Each case study will focus on the dimensions of interdependence in Table 1 
which, when combined, will provide a broad survey of the nature of the relationship 
between Kyrgyzstan and the two great powers.  Benefits evaluated will include those 
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advantages the small state gleans from an interdependent relationship with the large 
power.  Security benefits, always problematic to define, consist of those specific 
advantages brought from interdependent relationships, which improve military efficacy 
and territorial integrity of the weak state.  These will be predominantly associated with 
traditional “high” politics issues such as security treaties and guarantees, military 
equipment and training assistance, etc.  Security benefits will also include support 
received helping the small state address internal security matters, to include terrorism, 
extremism, and narcotic trafficking.  Economic benefits include the arrangements of an 
interdependent relationship, which positively advance the economic well-being of the 
weak state, such as foreign direct assistance, favorable tariff policies, well-developed 
trade arrangements, etc.  Political benefits include political independence and 
independence in foreign and domestic policy making efforts.  Other political benefits 
include protection against external interference in such policy making as well as public 
support in international forums for external and internal policies (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Dimensions of Interdependence 
 
As for determining the costs involved, a subjective evaluation will be done at each 
of the two snapshots in time in the Kyrgyz relationship with the great power.  Potential 
costs attend all the benefits associated with Kyrgyzstan’s great power relationship.  The 
nature of the costs involved might cross dimensions (i.e. an economic cost is involved 
with a political benefit received), so a macro-level analysis is necessary to assess the  
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negative side of Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with each of the great powers.  If sensitivity is 
evident due to the costs outweighing the benefits, then the dimension or dimensions 
which dominate those costs will be highlighted if possible. 
5. Data Assessment 
For each Kyrgyz – great power relationship at each particular time, a decision will 
be made whether Kyrgyzstan was sensitive or not-sensitive to the great power based on 
the cost-benefit calculation.  Given this binary measurement, each snapshot of the Kyrgyz 
sensitivity to each great power at both the 2001 and 2005 marks can be compared to 
measure a vulnerability trend in the relationship, allowing for a finite number of potential 
results (see Table 2).  Possible outcomes for each Kyrgyz – Great Power relationship 
include an increase, decrease, or continuation in Kyrgyz vulnerability to the larger state.  
It is also possible to see a Kyrgyz non-vulnerability to a particular great power.  Given 
both the historical roots of Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Russia as well as the depth of 
U.S. engagement in Central Asia after 9/11, non-vulnerable trends (within-case outcome 
#4) are not expected, but not discounted either.  With vulnerability trends evaluated for 
both the Kyrgyz-Russian and Kyrgyz-U.S. relationships, the two sets of data can be 
compared with one another to gain a broader understanding of the intricacies of 
Kyrgyzstan’s strategy with both states. 
 





Comparing vulnerability trends from one Kyrgyz- Great Power relationship to the 
next helps us determine what perceptions of reality Kyrgyz decision makers hold.  Table 
3 summarizes the list of expected outcomes.  Outcome #1 would be Kyrgyzstan’s 
weakest position, showing how the small state continues to be vulnerable to both the 
United States and Russia.  Realist explanations would suggest how a marginalized 
Kyrgyzstan views its position, knowing it is completely at the whim of the great powers 
and unable to change the situation.  Outcome #2 and outcome #4 are also outcomes 
indicating a realist world and indicate a cautious Kyrgyz hedge betting strategy favoring 
either the United States (outcome #2) or Russia (outcome #4).  Outcome 4, for example, 
indicates a Kyrgyz opportunistic strategy.  It accepts certain costs in order to reap 
benefits through increased U.S. engagement, but sustains Russian ties because of doubts 
of long-term U.S. commitment.   
 
Table 3. Possible Outcomes of Vulnerability Trends in a Cross-Case Comparison 
 
The most perilous realist outcome for Kyrgyzstan is outcome #5, showing that 
despite an increased vulnerability to the United States since 9/11 Kyrgyz inclinations are 
to simultaneously reinforce ties with Russia.  Kyrgyzstan, previously considered non-
vulnerable to Russia and the United States, voluntarily throws its allegiance to both great 
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powers.  Kyrgyzstan recognizes that its vulnerability to the United States had rapidly 
become deep and risky.  To mitigate this risk, Kyrgyzstan then also increases its 
vulnerability with Russia in order to have another security outlet. 
Outcomes #6 and #8 are the final realist models.  These outcomes show a major 
reverse in vulnerabilities from 2001 to 2005 from one great power to the next.  Realist 
explanations suggest bandwagoning behavior, especially for outcome #6 where a 
significant increase in U.S. engagement post-9/11 would provide Kyrgyzstan a new 
bandwagon outcome.   
Outcomes #3 and #7 are complex interdependent outcomes, highlighting 
Kyrgyzstan’s capacity to decrease vulnerability with one power without having to 
increase its vulnerability with the next.  This suggests Kyrgyzstan is using strategies to 
advance its position and lower the costs with one of the powers.  In turn, outcome #9 
would be the optimal complex interdependent explanation where the increased U.S. 
engagement opened up opportunities to decrease its vulnerability with both the United 
States and Russia.  Other sources of Kyrgyz vulnerability such as its relationship with 
China would need to be explored to verify this outcome. 
Outcomes #7, #8, and #9 are not anticipated outcomes.  As stated, given the 
breadth and depth of U.S. engagement in Central Asia generically and Kyrgyzstan 
specifically since launching the War on Terror, it is not expected that vulnerabilities will 
decrease with the United States.  The most conservative outcome anticipated would be a 
consistency in vulnerability. 
Once all the data is compiled and assessed, a decision reflecting Kyrgyz 
vulnerability shifts will be made.  From this point, an evaluation of Kyrgyz foreign policy 
behavior will follow.  Specific trends in policy behavior will be collected, if possible, and 
used to make a broader assessment of Kyrgyz foreign policy strategies.  In turn, the 
implications for U.S. engagements strategies and appropriate policy recommendations 
will be presented given the findings of the study.  The way forward begins with collecting 
the appropriate data on Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with the United States and Russia. 
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III. KYRGYZSTAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
A. THE KYRGYZ-U.S. RELATIONSHIP, JANUARY 2001 
1. U.S. Interest in Kyrgyzstan, 2001 
Oliver Roy, one of the world’s premier scholars on Central Asia, commented that 
“there is no great interest in [Kyrgyzstan] since it lacks natural resources.”68  Kyrgyzstan, 
though, was not ignored by either the world or the United States for both investment and 
engagement in the years following its independence.  World-wide involvement in Kyrgyz 
development came from multiple sources, including Japan, the Asian Development Bank, 
and the World Bank.  The United States, for its part, pursued a methodical, multi-faceted 
approach to Kyrgyzstan.  This engagement was modest in relation to overall U.S. foreign 
policy efforts and often fell under the guise of collective Central Asian diplomacy rather 
than specific U.S.-Kyrgyz bilateral measures. 
The U.S. engagement strategy toward Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of 2001 
closely mirrored the broad objectives of the U.S. National Security Strategy as presented 
by President Bill Clinton at the end of his second term.  The U.S. security approach 
centered around three principal goals: enhancing security at home and abroad, promoting 
prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights.69  The U.S. strategy set tasks in 
Central Asia of democracy and free market promotion, access to Caspian energy 
resources, and nonproliferation.  These often did not complement one another.  In fact, 
they often clashed. 
Several observers noted the Janus-faced nature of the U.S. engagement policy 
toward Central Asia at the turn of the century.  If the United States needed to associate 
with authoritarian or repressive regimes for the sake of larger energy policies, it would.70  
The engagement programs with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan often 
revolved around energy access rather than democratic transition and open markets.  It is 
                                                 
68 Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: New York University 
Press, 2000), 192. 
69 U.S. President, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, The White House, December 2000, 
Section I. 
70 Stephen Blank, “The United States and Central Asia,” in Central Asia: The New International 
Context, Roy Allison and Lena Jonson ed. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 134. 
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not that the United States still did not pursue democratic and free market goals.  Rather, 
its efforts often produced lackluster results as the Central Asian nations understood that 
the United States valued energy access over democracy.  When energy polices are less 
emphasized, democracy promotion would be more sacrosanct and advance to the 
forefront of U.S. policy.71  Even then, U.S. policy was more regionally-based than 
nation-based, as the U.S. approach to Kyrgyzstan would show. 
Kyrgyzstan’s place in the greater U.S. foreign policy toward Central Asia was 
based more on democracy promotion and market reform rather than energy.  Since it did 
not possess the same raw material reserves like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan was forced to pursue other approaches to development in the 
post-independence years.  Kyrgyzstan’s early democracy and market reform efforts 
helped propel its reputation above its Central Asian neighbors.  Common language in 
U.S. government statements and publications labels Kyrgyzstan as the “most open, 
progressive, and cooperative” nation in Central Asia.72  Unsurprisingly, when U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Bishkek in April 2000, she heavily 
emphasized that “the best guarantee of Kyrgyzstan’s security is democracy,” consistently 
highlighting irregularities in Kyrgyz elections and violations of human rights norms.73 
The United States did have specific security concerns germane to Kyrgyzstan.  
Anne Sigmund, the former U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, stated that the country is 
important security-wise since “its location [sits] astride a strategic arc of instability along 
which East and West have historically clashed.”74  Thus, U.S. security interests in  
                                                 
71 Blank, 134. 
72 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “USAID 2004 Congressional Budget 
Justification: Europe and Eurasia – Kyrgyzstan,” 28 February 2003.  Available online at 
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Kyrgyzstan at the turn of the century focused on border security, regional security, and 
peacekeeping while still focusing on democracy promotion as the long-term solution to 
prevent radical and extremist organizations from overwhelming the country.75 
2. Kyrgyz Political Benefits from U.S. Engagement, 2001 
President Askar Akayev’s early flirtations with Western norms as well as his open 
personality helped him secure many political benefits from the United States in the years 
after independence.  President Akayev’s handling of the August 1991 crisis and his 
willingness to oppose the military coup in the Soviet Union impressed many Western 
observers, earning him great credibility in diplomatic circles.  Additionally, his 
enthusiasm for market reform, democratic liberalization, and religious tolerance made 
him a leader in Central Asia, which the West was equally enthusiastic about supporting.  
This enthusiasm helped make Kyrgyzstan a “laboratory” for democratic principles and 
market reform in Central Asia.76  Secretary of State James Baker noted upon meeting 
President Akayev in Bishkek that “in a region more prone to warlords than Jeffersonian 
democrats, Akayev was an anomaly who genuinely believed in democracy and free 
markets.”77   
In addition to quickly establishing formal diplomatic relations with the United 
States in 1991 shortly after independence, Kyrgyzstan also secured a sustained U.S. 
engagement strategy in the country when the U.S. Congress passed the Freedom Support 
Act of 1992.  Although not solely directed at Kyrgyzstan, this legislation formalized the 
broad policy approach for U.S. engagement in Central Asia, emphasizing the necessity of 
democracy and market economies for Central Asian development.78  Later in the decade, 
the U.S. Congress reemphasized the strategic importance of the region with the passing 
of the Silk Road Strategy Act in 1999, amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to 
include Central Asian stipulations.  This legislation included specific provisions for 
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border control improvement in Central Asia to mitigate trans-national threats like WMD 
and narcotics trafficking.79  Additionally, this act included for the first time specific anti-
terrorism measures focused on Central Asia.  All these measures provided Kyrgyzstan 
with tangible assistance in economic and security dimensions, but also provided a certain 
degree of legitimacy to the Kyrgyz leadership as a result of its dealings with the United 
States.  Kyrgyzstan, in turn, used its new relationship with the United States to leverage 
U.S. leadership in Kyrgyz efforts in other fora. 
For example, Kyrgyzstan’s World Treaty Organization (WTO) accession in 
December 1998 would have been more problematic without U.S. technical and political 
support.  The United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and other programs, assisted Kyrgyzstan with WTO accession by assisting the 
development of private sector and public support for membership, by reviewing trade 
patterns, by assisting in the creation of new trade laws, by improving institutional 
structures aiding WTO negotiations, and by providing advice on trade strategies.80  The 
United States assisted Kyrgyzstan, along with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan, by training “more than 1500 government officials, judges, journalists, 
businesspersons, and lawyers in WTO-related policy and legal issues.”81  The Kyrgyz 
leadership was acutely aware of the benefits gained from U.S. leadership.  Kyrgyz 
Ambassador to the United States Baktybek Abdrisaev praised U.S. support, touting that 
economic developments made in the country’s first ten years were due “to invaluable 
assistance from the United States,” specifically lauding USAID’s contributions 
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3. Kyrgyz Economic Benefits from U.S. Engagement, 2001 
a. Kyrgyz Trade with the United States, 2001 
2000 was a good year for Kyrgyz trade relations with the United States, 
although structural improvement and not trade performance drove this optimism.  
Kyrgyzstan was the first NIS to “graduate” from provisions delineated in the Jackson-
Vanik amendment in Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, relieving U.S. trade with 
Kyrgyzstan being subjected to presidential reports and waivers concerning human rights 
and emigration issues.83  Nonetheless, the overall trade levels between the two countries 
remained quite modest.  In 2000, Kyrgyzstan only exported U.S. $2.9 million of goods to 
the United States, representing only 0.5% of their total exports for the year (see Table 
4).84  Primary exports to the United States included antimony, mercury, and other rare-
earth metals as well as chemical products.85   
 
Table 4. Kyrgyz Exports and Imports with the United States, 1997-2000 (From: 




Kyrgyz imports for 2000 from the United States totaled U.S. $53.8 million, representing 
9.7% of their total imports (see Table 4).86  American imported products included 
foodstuffs like grain, rice and meat, as well as machinery, agricultural equipment, 
medicine, and medical equipment.87 
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b. U.S. Investment in Kyrgyzstan, 2001 
By the beginning of 2001, foreign direct investment (FDI) originating 
from the United States had fallen dramatically.  FDI flows from the United States for 
2000 were U.S. $1.8 million, down from the peak of U.S. $25.5 million in 1998 (see 
Table 5).88  This could be attributed to investor reluctance following the 1998 collapse of 
the ruble and the economic fallout in most former Soviet economies.  The United States 
was the eighth largest FDI originator in Kyrgyzstan in 2000, with the Netherlands (U.S. 
$9.2 million) and Germany (U.S. $8.2) investing the most. 
 
Table 5. Foreign Direct Investment from the United States into Kyrgyzstan, 1996-
2000 (From: Source: The United Nations; a - data unavailable) 
 
 
c. U.S. Assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 2001 
While specific U.S. trade and investment rates continued to be marginally 
beneficial to Kyrgyzstan, U.S. governmental assistance continued to be a major 
contributor to the sustainment of the Kyrgyz economy.  2000 was another consistently 
strong year of U.S. grants to Kyrgyzstan, covering a broad spectrum of areas.  The U.S. 
government allocated U.S. $60.1 million to Kyrgyzstan in 2000, making the combined 
amount of aid from 1993-2000 U.S. $511.2 million at an annual average of $63.9 million.  
These figures include both economic and security assistance, taken from multiple 
governmental sources such as FREEDOM Support Act, Department of State, Department 
of Defense, and Department of Energy (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.   U.S. Assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 1993-2000 
 
Of the five Central Asian newly independent states, Kyrgyzstan received 
the highest amount per capita for assistance distributed by USAID, which targets 
democratic, developmental, and market reforms.  This reflects strongly the U.S. 
government’s willingness to promote the advancement of democracy and market reform 
in Kyrgyzstan so it could be a model for the other nations in the region (see Figure 9). 
4. Kyrgyz Security Benefits from U.S. Engagement, 2001 
a. Security Guarantees, 2001 
Although no formal security treaties or agreements were signed between 
Kyrgyzstan and the United States in the first ten years after Kyrgyzstan’s independence, 
the United States did adjust its worldview on the importance of Central Asia in a 
globalized and volatile world.  Kyrgyzstan would benefit from this shift.  For example, 
U.S. Central Command assumed the geographical responsibility of the five Central Asian 
former Soviet republics, including Kyrgyzstan.89  This shift emphasized the “greater 
Middle East” role of Central Asia, but also potentially placed the area in a position of 
third priority behind Middle East energy concerns and the security situation in the 
Levant.90  
                                                 
89 U.S. Department of Defense,  “Unified Command Plan Changes Announced,” Defense Link Press 
Release 085-98, 25 February 1998,  Online at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1998/b02251998_bt085-
98.html Last accessed 6 May 2005. 
90 Blank, “The United States and Central Asia,” 141. 
42 
 
Figure 9.   USAID Assistance to the Central Asian Republics, per Capita 
 
Kyrgyzstan received a moral boost of support when the U.S. State 
Department designated the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) “Foreign Terrorist 
Organization” on 15 September 2000.  Although this would not have a tangible impact on 
Kyrgyzstan’s struggle with extremism and terrorism, it did allow Kyrgyzstan to reap 
benefits from U.S. governmental efforts such as blocking asset transactions and 
intelligence gathering.91 
U.S. assistance strategies were often tailored to help address some of 
Kyrgyzstan’s internal security challenges, focusing on community and individual level 
programs rather than larger governmental-focused projects.92  USAID specifically 
targeted Kyrgyzstan’s vulnerable south with emphasis on individual and community 
development through land privatization and small business development.93  Southern 
Kyrgyzstan is the nation’s poorest and least developed area, contributing to its reputation  
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as breeding grounds for extremist movements.  U.S. assistance thus helped Kyrgyzstan 
counter the growing influence of radical and extremist groups such as the IMU in the 
vulnerable south. 
b. Military Benefits, 2001 
Although military-to-military interaction was not as highly prioritized in 
the 1990’s as other DOD programs in the NIS such as Cooperative Threat Reduction, 
enough efforts were undertaken to lay down the foundation for a future working 
relationship.  To begin with, Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian state to join NATO’s 
newly established Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, and was considered an 
“enthusiastic, if not highly visible” member of the organization.94  Under the aegis of 
PfP, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan created the first regional peacekeeping unit, 
the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT).  Through this arrangement, Kyrgyzstan 
participated in several regional exercises.95  One of the first U.S. bilateral efforts to 
interact with the Kyrgyz military was through CENTRASBAT.  The United States 
sponsored annual exercises with the CENTRASBAT from 1996 to 2001.  The U.S. forces 
operated alongside those of the CENTRASBAT unit as well as other participants, 
mentoring Central Asian forces on NATO-style combat and peacekeeping operations.96 
These exercises in the “spirit of Partnership for Peace” were critical for the Kyrgyz 
military’s awareness of western military norms and procedures. 
Another unique opportunity for the Kyrgyz military under the sponsorship 
of PfP was the State Partnership Program.  This NATO initiative administered under the 
U.S. National Guard Bureau established permanent exchange relationships between the 
Kyrgyz military and the Montana National Guard.  Montana was chosen as the exchange 
state for Kyrgyzstan due to the similarity of terrain between the two regions.  This 
program sought to increase bilateral relations between Kyrgyzstan and the United States 
through a working relationship across a spectrum of military-related activities.  Examples 
include disaster and emergency service exercises, infantry exchanges, cadet programs, 
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and law enforcement assistance.  Through this partnership, Kyrgyzstan was exposed to a 
multitude of U.S. programs emphasizing how the military is integrated into civilian-
controlled armed forces.97 
Additionally, CENTCOM conducted bilateral training activities involving 
U.S. Special Forces (SF).  These SF teams trained for one month periods in Kyrgyzstan, 
focusing on small team formation tactics designed against terrorists and insurgents.98  
Although not grand in scope, these exchanges also paved the way for future military 
cooperation efforts.  CENTCOM also expanded International Military Education and 
Training opportunities for Kyrgyzstan.  Finally, pre-2001 diplomatic efforts culminated 
with Secretary of State Madeline Albright announcement in April 2000 of the Central 
Asian Border Security Initiative (CASI), allocating $3 million to each Central Asian state 
specifically to address limitations of each nation’s border control measures.99 
5. Costs of Kyrgyz Engagement with the United States, 2001 
The evidence evaluated suggests that Kyrgyz benefits received from several of the 
dimensions from the United States did not significantly alter or improve Kyrgyzstan’s 
position within that dimension.  Economically, both trade and investment were relatively 
marginal between Kyrgyzstan and the United States.  Although Kyrgyzstan imported a 
moderate amount of goods from the United States, the types of goods imported could 
potentially have been bought from other Western nations.  Investment by U.S. companies 
is still hampered by high levels of corruption and the lingering impact of the 1998 
financial crisis. 
As far a security is concerned, there is no evidence suggesting that the assistance 
given in either security guarantees or military-to-military engagement significantly 
improved the Kyrgyz security dilemma.  The military equipment donated to Kyrgyzstan 
through assistance programs was non-lethal, and did not necessarily improve 
Kyrgyzstan’s capacity to protect its borders or repel insurgents.  Kyrgyzstan endured a 
series of raids by IMU insurgents in the late summer of 2000.  Although the Kyrgyz 
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security forces performed better than the previous year, the fact that the insurgents could 
easily penetrate southern Kyrgyzstan showed just how neglected Kyrgyz security forces 
were at the turn of the century.  The designation of the IMU as a terrorist organization by 
the United States did not influence the outcome of the insurgency, and no U.S. military or 
other security efforts directly assisted Kyrgyzstan in its fight.  The education of Kyrgyz 
military officers through IMET funds or PfP/Marshall Center programs is significant, but 
its full impact is not being felt at the beginning of 2001.  In the end, only the large sums 
of U.S. assistance directed at democratic and economic reforms had the potential to 
influence Kyrgyzstan’s development significantly. 
U.S. engagement strategies were unable to influence outcomes and elite 
perceptions in Kyrgyzstan.  As identified by the FREEDOM Support Act and its 
modification of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President must “take into account 
not only [the] relative need but also the extent to which that independent state is acting 
to…” the spirit and intent of the assistance given.100  The President could subjectively 
determine if Kyrgyzstan is or is not fulfilling its obligations in pursuit of democratic 
reform, free and fair elections, and the rights of the individuals.  The State Department’s 
FY2000 report on assistance to the NIS highlights substantial irregularities in 
Kyrgyzstan’s commitment to the principles mandated by U.S. assistance.  As it turned 
out, 2000 was a very bad year in Kyrgyzstan on all the goals addressed by U.S. aid. 
Both the 2000 Kyrgyz parliamentary and presidential elections were marred by 
serious flaws and irregularities, giving further evidence to observers that Kyrgyzstan was 
walking away from its earlier attempts to transition to a democracy.  Much of the election 
manipulation was done by structures President Akayev created to assist his hold on 
power, such as the Central Election Committee. 
The first Central Election Committee (CEC) was established in 1994 in 
anticipation of the 1995 parliamentary elections.  Although the CEC was constitutionally 
supposed to be created by the legislature, Akayev formed the committee himself and 
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stacked it in his favor.101  Out of the 15 committee members, only three were from 
political parties while the rest were from the government as appointed by Akayev.  
Government marginalization of the opposition increased in 2000 elections.  The CEC 
created new “rules” specifically designed to weed out candidates.  These rules include 
eliminating candidates for failing to declare property, for having a minor criminal record, 
or for failing the Kyrgyz language test.102  The most serious method of opposition 
elimination, however, was Akayev’s decision to put his major political opponent behind 
bars before the election. 
Feliks Kulov was the first presidential candidate to have both the credibility and 
the personality to challenge Akayev in a free and fair election.  After leaving his post as 
vice president, Kulov filled several other key positions in government such as Minister of 
National Security and Mayor of Bishkek.  After publicly disagreeing with several of 
Akayev’s policies in 1999, Kulov resigned from his mayoral position and established the 
Ar-Namys opposition party with the goal of defeating Akayev in the October 2000 
presidential elections.  Within weeks of declaring his candidacy Kulov was arrested on 
charges that he had abused power while Minister of National Security from 1997-98.  
After five months in jail, Kulov was tried in a military tribunal and acquitted of all 
charges.  A presiding judge quickly annulled Kulov’s acquittal and sentenced him to 
seven years in prison.  This was a very high profile case in Kyrgyzstan, and Amnesty 
International considered Kulov to Kyrgyzstan’s most vivid example of a political 
prisoner.103 
The parliamentary elections of 2000 also saw vast governmental interference in 
the election process.  As in the presidential elections, the CEC was at the center of the 
controversy.  President Akayev pushed through an election reform law in 1999 to 
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eliminate “inconvenient politicians from the race.”104  This law legalized a mandatory 
one-year registration deadline for parliamentary elections.  With the law passed in April 
1999 and the parliamentary elections being held in February 2000, any candidate not 
registered at the time of the law passage was ineligible for the elections.  This included 
Kulov’s party, which was seen as the major contender to Akayev’s entrenched 
establishment.   
President Akayev was able to consolidate power in Kyrgyzstan in spite of eight 
years of assistance coming from the United States for election reform and democracy.  
The outcomes of these elections severely disturbed the U.S. leadership in Kyrgyzstan.  
Then Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan John O’Keefe related that he wanted to punish Akayev 
for the poor democratic showing in both elections during 2000 through the removal of 
specific assistance programs.  But when he looked at the numbers, very little of U.S. 
assistance by late 2000 was going to the government.  Most of the assistance funds were 
targeted to “bottom-up” programs, which were genuinely aiding Kyrgyz society.105  
Without this economic stick, the Ambassador had little capability to punish President 
Akayev for his actions. 
6. Assessment of the Kyrgyz-U.S. Relationship, 2001 
Overall, the pre-9/11 sensitivity assessment of Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with the 
United States is rated as “not sensitive.”  Although certain dimensions appear to be 
beneficial, Kyrgyzstan’s overall position in the international order would not be 
significantly affected by the removal of U.S. engagement.  Additionally, the dimensions 
of U.S. engagement which penetrate deepest into Kyrgyz society did not significantly 
compel the Kyrgyz leadership in any tangible way to accede to U.S. influence.   
B. THE KYRGYZ-U.S. RELATIONSHIP, MAY 2005 
1. U.S. Interest in Kyrgyzstan, 2005 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington changed 
many U.S. perceptions and priorities, including its engagement strategy for Central Asia.  
Operation Enduring Freedom and the continual presence of U.S. and NATO forces in 
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Afghanistan compelled the United States to forge deeper relationships with the Central 
Asian Republics.  The post-9/11 U.S. vision for Central Asian engagement, including 
Kyrgyzstan, falls in line with the ongoing themes presented in the Bush administration’s 
first post-9/11 National Security Strategy. 
The September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a definitive change 
in tone from the previous strategies issued from President Clinton.  The new NSS clearly 
indicates that the United States considers itself at war.  To execute the Global War on 
Terrorism, the Bush administration introduced new approaches and strategies in order to 
provide an expanded range of options to defeat the global terrorist threat.  While the most 
controversial element has been its emphasis on preemption, President Bush’s NSS also 
focuses on core beliefs in the right of liberty and justice for all people, keeping individual 
freedom and democratic institutions as principle themes.106  The strategy continues to 
emphasize the promotion of democracy through foreign aid for those who support it in 
non-violent ways, and promises to support and reward those nations who make positive 
steps away from authoritarian regimes.107  The 2002 National Security Strategy identified 
the need to support the “independence and stability of the states of the former Soviet 
Union” in order to promote regional stability and contribute to Russia’s integration into 
the Western world.108  Despite its strong anti-terror focus, it lacks specific measures 
concerning strategy formulation for Central Asia.  Rather, it delegates that task to other 
documents like the National Defense Strategy. 
The 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy helps translate the Bush administrations 
strategic goals into actual policies for Central Asia.  One of the principal necessities of 
the defense strategy is the need to secure strategic access in order to maintain freedom of 
movement to conduct of the Global War on Terrorism.109  This includes enabling access 
to critical regions, lines of communication, and global commons.110  The National 
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Defense Strategy justifies global access as a means to promote security and prosperity of 
the United States, to ensure freedom of action, to help secure critical partnerships in the 
war on terror, and to help protect the integrity of the global economic system.  Global 
access is also an enabler of the preemption strategy articulated in the NSS. 
A. Elizabeth Jones, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian 
Affairs, noted that the United States is  
linked with [Central Asia] in ways we could have never imagined before 
September 11.  Our policy in Central Asia must include a commitment to 
deeper, more sustained, and better coordinated engagement on the full 
range of issues upon which we agree and disagree.111   
The U.S. State Department identifies “promoting regional stability, development of 
democratic, market-based systems, and combating terrorism and narcotic smuggling” as 
its strategic goals in Central Asia.112   
Central Asia is far from ignored by the U.S leadership.  President Bush welcomed 
President Akayev to the White House in September 2002, and Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld visited the region annually from 2001-2003 as well as to Kyrgyzstan in April 
2005.  The United States calls Kyrgyzstan a “dependable and outspoken ally in the 
Global War on Terrorism,” emphasizing the country’s contributions to the anti-terror 
campaign while downplaying its regression concerning democratic reform.113  While it is 
true U.S. engagement strategies still use the full spectrum of assistance, it is the general 
perception that security assistance has priority over normative issues since 9/11.114  The 
most quantifiable manifestation of U.S. interest in Kyrgyzstan is the stationing of U.S. 
and NATO forces at its airfield in Manas. 
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The U.S. Air Force-operated Peter J. Ganci Airbase in Manas, Kyrgyzstan is a 
critical node for the operations in Afghanistan.  The airfield, named after a New York 
City firefighter who perished during the 9/11 attacks, is the strategic hub for all forces 
entering the Central Asian theater from northern approaches.  With its 13,000 foot 
runway, the airfield supports the heaviest of Western airlift bringing in supplies and 
troops to Central Asia.  Additionally, the airfield has based both combat aircraft and 
aerial tankers supporting Operation Enduring Freedom activities.   
The U.S. Defense Department is also considering Manas as a potential forward 
operating site (FOS) or cooperative security location (CSL) as part of its global posture 
review, maintaining access to the facility for training or rapid-reaction operations.115  
While not as close to Afghanistan as the US Air Force’s other Central Asian main 
operating base, Karshi-Kalinabad Air Base, Uzbekistan, it has other benefits.   
In the initial airbase negotiations in Central Asia, Uzbekistan allegedly intended 
to restrict the amount and type of flights departing from its airfields.  Kyrgyzstan’s offer 
of Manas came without restrictions and provided a redundant access point in the 
region.116  Additionally, critics of U.S. engagement strategies with Central Asian 
dictatorships focus less on the U.S.-Kyrgyz relationship than on U.S. cooperation with 
Uzbekistan’s repressive President Islam Karimov.  Uzbekistan’s reluctance to improve its 
record on human rights resulted in suspension by the U.S. State Department of military 
assistance funds in 2004.117  Finally, President Karimov’s willingness to brutally crush 
an uprising in May 2005 makes Kyrgyzstan’s March 2005 revolution seem tame.  Even 
after the fall of its government, Kyrgyzstan is a more politically stable partner in Central 
Asia. 
Despite its emphasis on counter-terrorism, the United States did not abandon its 
hopes for democracy and market reform in Kyrgyzstan.  The State Department considers 
Kyrgyzstan “the most open [and] free society in Central Asia and the one most likely to 
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achieve sustainable reforms.”118  U.S. Ambassador Stephen Young described Kyrgyzstan 
as the “leader in the development of democracy in Central Asia.”119  U.S. assistance 
funds continued to prioritize democratic and economic reforms alongside increases in 
security assistance.  Kyrgyzstan, in turn, continued to benefit from these programs. 
2. Kyrgyz Political Benefits from U.S. Engagement, 2005 
President Akayev’s methodical decision to allow U.S. and NATO forces to 
operate from Kyrgyzstan was, to a certain degree, politically motivated.  As will be 
discussed, Akayev was to benefit from the merging of U.S. and Kyrgyz security interests 
concerning the Taliban and the IMU.  But Akayev and the Kyrgyz people were genuinely 
sympathetic to the United States after the 9/11 attacks, and Kyrgyzstan’s decision to offer 
an airbase represented what it was capable of contributing to the Coalition effort.120   
When President Bush linked the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan with al-Qaeda 
during his address to Congress after the 9/11 attacks, a clear alignment of threat 
perceptions occurred between the United States and Kyrgyzstan.121  The Kyrgyz 
leadership received instant legitimacy in its fight against terrorism, and this legitimacy 
helped convince President Akayev to join the U.S.-led “coalition of the willing.”  
Although Kyrgyz forces did not actively participate in operations in Afghanistan, 
Kyrgyzstan’s internal stability situation improved nonetheless.  Coalition forces inflicted 
heavy losses on IMU ranks that were in Afghanistan supporting the Taliban, and the 
threat of IMU incursions from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the scale of 1999-2000 
substantially decreased. 
The role of emphasizing and focusing on the threat of terrorism has benefited both 
the Akayev regime and those politicians vying for the July 2005 Presidential election.  
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Both camps have highlighted the stabilizing and deterrent effect of American forces on 
extremist forces in Kyrgyzstan.  Before the coup, President Akayev made a very public 
appearance at Manas to emphasize his contribution in the campaign against global 
terrorism, while the interim government continues to praise the American presence and 
reassure continued U.S. access.122 
Concerning Akayev’s rule, the political benefits of U.S. engagement are less 
clear.  Some analysts argue that the significant increase in U.S. engagement and presence 
in Central Asia allowed all regional leaders a certain freedom of movement concerning 
their grip on power.  The Central Asian rulers recognized the changes in U.S. regional 
priorities, with security concerns and military operations rising above normative agenda 
items such as democracy and market reform.123  The message received by the Central 
Asian presidents was that as long as the Central Asian states supported the United States 
with its high-priority issues like energy and Operation Enduring Freedom, the leaders 
could have more of a free hand to address the internal situation in their nation as they 
deemed fit.124   
President Akayev’s position, though, was not the same as the other Central Asian 
leaders.  The United States had been applying more pressure and investing more effort in 
democratic and market reform assistance in Kyrgyzstan than the other regional newly 
independent states..  Kyrgyzstan, too, did not have other options such as energy to use as 
leverage against the United States.  President Akayev’s capacity to use U.S. presence and 
implicit support of his regime as justification for power consolidation was a questionable 
proposition.  As discussed below, Akayev likely realized his position was very fragile 
and taking too much of a free hand for his own good was not going to be in his best 
interest. 
For example, Akayev almost started a civil war with a decision to transfer 
125,000 hectares of territory in a 2002 border agreement with China.  A Kyrgyz 
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parliamentarian, Azimbek Beknazarov, publicly protested the agreement citing breaches 
in Constitutional procedures, calling for Akayev’s impeachment.  To mute this 
opposition, Kyrgyz security forces arrested Beknazarov on corruption charges.  When 
Beknazarov was tried for this crime, protestors rallied in the southern Kyrgyz town of 
Aksy in his defense.  The protestors would eventually overwhelm Kyrgyz security forces, 
and on 17-18 March 2002 local police fired on the crowd, killing seven civilians in the 
process.  In turn, nation-wide protests formed calling for Akayev’s resignation.   
President Akayev refused to step down.  Rather, he sacked his government from 
Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev on down to appease calls for government 
accountability.125  But President Akayev also knew not to push any further, for he could 
easily be forcibly removed from office with a strong public showing even with more than 
three years left in his term.126  U.S. officials in Kyrgyzstan knew that Akayev’s position 
was frail, but also knew that the order to shoot the civilians came from the untrained local 
security forces and not Akayev himself.127  The United States was not giving political 
support to Akayev during this crisis.  The events and their outcomes were of Akayev’s 
doing alone.  Akayev did receive political support from the United States, however, 
through his connections at the U.S. airbase. 
One of the tangible political benefits the Akayev regime receive through 
increased U.S. engagement and presence in Kyrgyzstan involves contracts associated 
with Ganci airbase.  The United States unwittingly improved the financial well-being of 
Akayev’s inner circle through the many contracts awarded during and after the 
establishment of U.S. facilities at Ganci.  Each aircraft landing at Manas is assessed a 
$7,000 fee.  These fees go not to the state, but to an organization called Manas Airport 
Consortium, often described as an independent joint-stock business with close ties to 
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President Akayev’s family.128  The landing fees are in addition to airfield lease and 
aircraft parking agreements.  Furthermore, the company of Akayev’s son-in-law, Adil 
Toigonbayev, received the airfield fuel contract, estimated to be worth U.S. $25 million 
annually.129  Finally, the former President’s own son, Aidar Akayev, is reportedly to have 
received several contracts supporting base activities.130  These examples highlight the 
role of patronage in Kyrgyzstan, with the United States unknowingly enfranchising the 
ruling elite further by signing these contracts, often without competing bids. 
3. Kyrgyz Economic Benefits from U.S. Engagement, 2005 
Kyrgyzstan continued to benefit from U.S. measures aimed at improving 
structures promoting trade and investment with Kyrgyzstan, while the increase in U.S. 
engagement in the region was matched by increases in U.S. assistance.  Kyrgyz and U.S. 
officials signed the US-Kyrgyz Republic Memorandum on Bilateral Cooperation in 
February 2002.  This document focused on increasing and solidifying economic 
cooperation between the two nations, establishing goals and delineating intentions for 
both sides.131  Additionally, the Kyrgyz Ambassador signed a Trade and Investment 
Agreement with the U.S. trade representative in July 2004.  This program establishes a 
U.S.-Central Asian Council on Trade and Investment in order to facilitate efficient and 
barrier free economic exchanges between the two countries.132 
a. Kyrgyz Trade with the United States, 2005 
Kyrgyz total trade turnover with the United States has increased since 
2001.  By 2004, clothing and apparel items account for almost two-thirds of all Kyrgyz 
exports to the United States (see Table 6).133 
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Table 6. Kyrgyz exports and imports with the United States, 1997-2003 (From: 
Source: International Monetary Fund) 
 
   
Kyrgyzstan continued to import far more from the United States than it 
exports, with U.S. imports comprising between approximately 6-8% of all imported 
goods.  Machinery, foodstuffs, and medical equipment continue to be the primary goods 
imported from U.S. companies (see Table 6).134  
b. U.S. Investment in Kyrgyzstan, 2005 
U.S. Investment was stagnant in the first years after the 1998 economic 
crisis, but accelerated by 2003.  FDI outside of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) made up 81.3% of all FDI for 2003, which increased from 77.4% from the previous 
year.  The United States was fourth of the non-CIS investors with U.S. $9 million (6.7% 
of all FDI), behind Canada, Turkey, and China.135  The principle markets for U.S. 
investment include agriculture, telecommunications, services, and textiles.136 
c. U.S. Assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 2005 
Kyrgyzstan benefited in the years immediately following the terrorist 
attacks on the United States with a significant outpouring of U.S. financial assistance. 
2002 was the peak year of grants from the United States, with U.S. $114.98 million 
allotted.  Of this, 32% was earmarked as security assistance.  Of the previous years, only 
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an average of 2-3% was annually granted for security programs (see Figure 10).  Of note, 
assistance rates have settled to pre-9/11 amounts.  In the post-9/11 era, assistance 
designated under the aegis of FREEDOM Support Act and distributed by USAID for 
democracy and market reform has remained consistent both pre- and post-9/11 (see Table 
7). 
 
Figure 10.   U.S. Assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 1993-2006 
 
4. Kyrgyz Security Benefits from U.S. Engagement, 2005 
a. Security Guarantees, 2005 
Despite the shared threat perceptions concerning international terrorism 
and extremism, what is still lacking from the Kyrgyz perspective is a formal security 
agreement with the United States.  Kyrgyz membership in the “coalition of the willing” 
does not give it a legal guarantee from the United States to offer assistance in situations 
concerning armed aggression or even insurgent activity.  U.S. presence alone has 
possibly acted as a deterrent factor, dissuading extremist groups from actively pursuing 
operations in Kyrgyzstan.  But U.S. forces stationed at Manas are not designed to handle 
a threat like an armed insurgency crossing the Kyrgyz border from Tajikistan or 
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Uzbekistan.  Soldiers trained for those operations would have to be flown in from 
Uzbekistan or Afghanistan to perform such tasks.  It is unclear whether the United States 
would be assist Kyrgyzstan defend itself against another insurgent attack like the ones of 
1999-2000. 
Table 7. FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) and Security Percentages of U.S. 
Assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 1994-2006 
 
   
The IMU has been quietly gaining strength since 2001, and Kyrgyz and 
U.S. forces are evaluating indications of increased activity.  The IMU detonated bombs in 
the Kyrgyz cities of Bishkek and Osh in 2002 and 2003 respectively, and an alleged IMU 
attack on the U.S. embassy was foiled before its execution.137  Additionally, the IMU 
was responsible for another attack in Osh in 2004 in which one police officer was 
killed.138   
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b. Military Benefits, 2005 
The Kyrgyz armed forces have benefited from substantial U.S. military 
assistance since early 2001.  Through both traditional assistance channels as well as from 
supplemental funds, the Kyrgyz military has been able to increase the training of its 
troops as well as improve the equipment they use.  Specific examples of focused Kyrgyz 
training from the United States include non-commissioned officer training for mountain 
troops, Special Forces, and peacekeeping soldiers.139  The Kyrgyz have received medical 
training for its specialists, focusing on combat rescue situations.140  Additionally, Kyrgyz 
Special Forces joined U.S. Special Forces in Exercise Balance Knight in 2004.141 
Military equipment received from the United States is tailored to help the 
Kyrgyz armed forces move away from their reliance on Soviet-made equipment designed 
for large, armored, conventional battles.  Thus, the Kyrgyz military could apply this 
equipment to areas where they needed the most help, including border control, counter-
terrorism, Special Forces, and operations in mountainous terrain.  Such equipment 
included night vision devices and communication equipment for border troops, off-road 
vehicles, and refurbished helicopters for border control.142  Additionally, several Kyrgyz 
military units received infrastructure upgrades such as barracks and shooting ranges from 
U.S. assistance.143  Overall, both International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) rates increased since 2001 (see Table 8).   
The Kyrgyz ability to respond and address its terrorist threat has improved 
with U.S. engagement.  For example, Kyrgyz security and anti-terror specialists, who 
were specifically trained by U.S. Department of State-allocated Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) funds, responded to the scene of an assassination attempt on a Kyrgyz 
governmental official.  Using the training received from the United States, the Kyrgyz 
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specialists were able to perform post-event terrorist scene evaluations and evidence 
gathering.  In turn, the security agents were able to produce evidence to warrant search 
warrants, raid suspected hideouts, and arrest several extremists and their weapons 
caches.144 
 
Table 8. U.S. Military Assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 1994-2006 
 
   
 
5. Costs of Kyrgyz Engagement with the United States, 2005 
In order to evaluate the costs of Kyrgyz engagement with the United States, two 
broad areas will be addressed.  First, an evaluation of the costs endured by the Akayev 
regime before the March 2005 coup will be made.  In turn, costs will be assessed which 
will apply to both the Akayev regime and those who seek the Kyrgyz presidency in the 
July 2005 elections. 
Many observers and analysts commented that the emphasis on security-related 
issues and the prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism gave the Kyrgyz elite a free 
hand to consolidate power without fear of being held accountable to human rights 
violations.  While it could be argued that comments and statements about human rights 
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and press freedom violations or declarations against suspicious elections might not have 
been as pronounced post-9/11, the United States did not abandon its commitment to 
Kyrgyzstan’s democratic market transitions.  Several facts support this point. 
To begin with, the February 2005 Kyrgyz parliamentary elections were the first 
since 9/11, allowing no other visible opportunity for the United States to assess or protest 
the Kyrgyz electoral process.  Although low-key, the U.S. government, through its 
mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), did protest 
Kyrgyz freedom of press violations and Constitutional referendums allegedly 
manipulated by President Akayev.145  Additionally, the U.S. non-governmental 
organization Freedom House had consistently monitored changes in Kyrgyz status 
according to its ranking of individual freedoms and civil liberties.  Freedom House is 
commonly used by the U.S. government as a metric for progress in democratic 
transitions, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan its slide backwards was visibly noticed. 
Funding justifications for Kyrgyzstan’s democratic and market transitions 
continued to receive attention in the post-9/11 years.  The FY 2002 Kyrgyz report noted 
the increasing barriers erected by Kyrgyz officials in the development of independent 
media outlets, but reemphasized that small victories by USAID were contributing to a 
persistent campaign to ensure press freedoms.146  The FY 2003 report stressed the critical 
role of U.S.-funded democratic reform programs leading up to the 2005 parliamentary 
and presidential elections.147 
In each year’s annual assessment, the U.S. government chose to interpret the 
developments in Kyrgyzstan with cautious optimism.  When reviewing the “checklist for 
grounds of ineligibility” in each year’s State Department report, the President 
consistently answered “no” to the question of whether the Kyrgyz Republic has “engaged 
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or of 
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international law.”148  The U.S. government methodically chose to not push too 
aggressively in this forum to address irregularities in Kyrgyz behavior, noting that 
problems concerning human rights and democracy exist while still authorizing financial 
assistance to the struggling Kyrgyz government. 
It must be emphasized that increases in U.S. security assistance to Kyrgyzstan in 
the wake of 9/11 did not come at the expense of democracy and market reform programs.  
U.S. government funds specified under the FREEDOM Support Act constitute the 
majority of U.S. assistance for these agenda items, spread among technical support, 
expert advice, and grants to local organizations.149  FSA money for Kyrgyzstan has been 
consistently allotted, especially in the years both before and after 9/11.  The FY 2006 
budget request of U.S. $30 million continues the trend.  See Table 10.  All told, 23% of 
all FSA money granted to Kyrgyzstan since its independence has gone toward democracy 
promotion.150  The remaining FSA funds are principally allocated for market reform and 
societal development programs.  The increases in security assistance did not change the 
U.S. commitment to Kyrgyzstan’s democratic reform. 
It is problematic to infer direct causality of the Kyrgyz revolution in March 2005 
from U.S. democracy assistance.  On the other hand, the United State might have decided 
to exert some influence, even in a small way, to bolster the efforts of the government 
opposition.  Twelve years of U.S. assistance in Kyrgyzstan may have paid off after a long 
investment.  Almost a generation of Kyrgyz youth has grown accustomed to the U.S. and 
Western approaches to aid and assistance through NGOs.  Given this investment, the 
United States potentially decided to leverage some of those investments to help promote 
change in Central Asia.  U.S. Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic Stephen Young 
suggested that a “peaceful transfer of power” would enable other similar transitions in the 
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other Central Asian Republics.151  Some observers even suggest that the United States 
views Kyrgyzstan as a “wedge to pry open its energy rich neighbors.”152  Even if U.S. 
actions are not as deliberate as this, there is the potential that U.S. representatives saw an 
opportunity to act on the words they had been preaching.  Ambassador Young reminded 
observers after the coup that the United States had not strayed from its dedication to the 
spread of democracy.  In an interview, Ambassador Young commented that… 
…my mission in this country is to assist the people and government of 
Kyrgyzstan in their efforts to build a stable, prosperous, and democratic 
society…The fact is that we are in no way apologetic or ashamed of our 
support for democracy, and we have been very transparent in the various 
programs we have promoted to encourage free, fair, and transparent 
elections, the growth of civil society and the expansion of a free media.153 
Concerning an independent press, Ambassador Young found an opportunity to 
sustain U.S. commitments to a free and fair media.  Kyrgyz opposition newspapers and 
printing presses have been frequent targets of government influence and control in recent 
years.  After the parliamentary elections, a Freedom House-funded printing press was to 
print 200,000 copies of an opposition newspaper.  When the printing press suspiciously 
lost power, the U.S. Embassy quickly provided generators to allow the printing to 
continue.  The newspaper would eventually contribute to mobilizing opposition in protest 
of the elections, contributing to the revolution, which would occur later that month.154  
The United States chose to exercise some influence in this case.  Although it is a small 
measure it helps show how fragile the Kyrgyz government’s grip on power was and how 
sensitive it is to U.S. influence.  U.S. officials downplay these efforts, noting that the 
United States has been focused on the election process in Kyrgyzstan, and that there were 
definitely “edgier” approaches to take with the old regime if desired.155   
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Kyrgyz susceptibility to U.S. influence is not limited to the old regime.  Those 
candidates considering running for the Kyrgyz presidency face similar costs as Akayev 
faced.  First, the security benefits are becoming substantial.  Kyrgyz soldiers are 
becoming accustomed to the high quality of U.S.-supplied equipment.  Items such as 
night vision goggles are capability-enhancing items.  When this equipment breaks or 
needs to be replaced, Kyrgyz soldiers will insist on the same capabilities to perform the 
tasks necessary for Kyrgyz security, preferring not to take a step backwards in capability.  
The costs of the United States not supplying this type of equipment or the funds to 
procure it are becoming high.  More so, Kyrgyz soldiers are beginning to realize that 
Russia is not able to provide the amount or quality of equipment and assistance that the 
United States offers, further embedding the value of U.S. programs on average Kyrgyz 
soldiers.156  Additionally, U.S. economic assistance continues to sustain market reform 
and democratic transition programs.  The removal of these funds would undermine 
Kyrgyzstan’s final push toward a free and democratic society, deepening the challenges 
from extremism, crime, and narcotic threats while stalling the Kyrgyz fight against 
poverty. 
Finally, those who take the helm of Kyrgyzstan’s government will have to decide 
how the relationship with the United States influences their relationship with Russia.  
Most observers generally see all the Kyrgyz Presidential candidates as having a pro-
United States outlook.157  The pro-U.S. stance might have long-term costs for 
Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Russia, although there is not enough evidence to evaluate 
this issue fully.  The future Kyrgyz leadership will have to evaluate whether continued 
U.S. engagement is worth potential degradation to Kyrgyzstan’s long history with the 
Russian people. 
6. Assessment of the Kyrgyz-U.S. Relationship, 2005 
Overall, the post-9/11 sensitivity assessment of Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with the 
United States is rated as “sensitive.”  All dimensions of U.S. engagement have 
significantly deepened in Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyzstan’s overall position in the 
international order would be significantly affected by the removal this engagement.  U.S. 
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assistance strategies in both security and economic spheres are beginning to pay-off, 
while the political links between the two countries became further entrenched during and 
after the contested February 2005 Parliamentary elections.  Kyrgyz sensitivity, even 
though considered strong in 2005, still has the potential to increase further with the 
United States should Kyrgyz policy makers choose to do so. 
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IV. KYRGYZSTAN AND RUSSIA 
A. THE KYRGYZ-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP, JANUARY 2001 
1. Russian Interest in Kyrgyzstan, 2001 
Russia’s interest in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of 2001 is 
significant because it departs from its previous outlook.  In his first year in office, 
President Putin brought Central Asia back into mainstream Russian foreign policy 
thinking after a decade of neglect under President Yeltsin.  The Russian government 
issued a new National Security Concept in February 2000 and a Russian Military 
Doctrine in April 2000 articulating this vision, including some clear guidelines where 
Central Asia stood in Russia’s larger foreign policy concept.   
Recent NATO decisions such as expansion, agreement on out-of-area operations, 
and its air campaign against Serbia disturbed the Russian leadership.158  Furthermore, 
U.S. and NATO programs like International Military Education and Training (IMET), 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) indicated a Western 
willingness to encroach on areas clearly within the strategic interest of the Russian 
Federation.  On top of this, new economic challenges emerged from U.S. and European 
companies, specifically in the energy sector.159  The Russian government was determined 
to reassert Russian primacy in the region.  The National Security Concept emphasized the 
re-emergence of a multi-polar world and Russia’s place in it, specifically opposing the 
“growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the 
economic and power domination of the United States.”160  Russia clearly wanted to 
counter the growing Western influence in Central Asia, suggesting it would use both 
bilateral and multilateral arenas to stem the influence of the United States and Europe and 
in turn create “a good-neighbor belt along the perimeter of Russia’s borders.”161  But 
Russia also perceived a genuine security threat from its southern flank. 
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Russia was coming to terms with the depth of its threat from Islamic groups.  The 
second war in Chechnya and Islamic offensives in Dagestan indicated to the Russians the 
expanding threat from extremism.  The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s (IMU) 
incursions into Kyrgyzstan further embedded this mindset, convincing Putin that Russia 
needed to become more involved in the security of Central Asia.162  Putin perceived the 
events in Kyrgyzstan as a window of opportunity to increase Russia’s own security in the 
south through regional cooperation with the Central Asian states.163  Russia’s concern 
with Central Asia was not the borders specifically, but the lack of barriers protecting 
Russia from all sources of instability originating from the south.164  The Russians 
believed the flow of extremism, narcotics, and refugees could travel unhindered from 
Afghanistan and the former Soviet republics to Russia’s border, and it was in their best 
security interest to prevent this from happening as close to the source as possible.165   
Russia’s commitment to Kyrgyzstan thus revolved around a mutual desire to 
address the aforementioned transnational threats.  Kyrgyzstan had always been receptive 
to Moscow’s engagement, and an increased rapprochement in the late 1990s and early 
2000 was welcomed by Bishkek.  This was advantageous for Russia, since its relations 
with neighboring Uzbekistan could sometimes be acrimonious.  With good relations with 
Kyrgyzstan and its southern neighbor Tajikistan, Russia could guarantee access into the 
region to address threats at the source. 
2. Kyrgyz Political Benefits from Russian Engagement, 2001 
The foundation of the Kyrgyz-Russian political dialogue is a series of bilateral 
agreements designed to show the commitment of each country to the next.  The most 
recent agreement is the 2000 “Declaration of Eternal Friendship and Partnership between 
the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation.”  This framework intended to uplift  
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Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Russia, indicating a determined effort by both parties of a 
long-term partnership.  The Kyrgyz-Russian friendship is a natural bond on several 
accounts.  
First and foremost, the shared history between Kyrgyzstan and Russia is 
continued through similar governments.  Both are structured vertically with an increasing 
amount of control in the hands of the president.  The Kyrgyz, like many of the other 
Central Asian states, maintain an excessive amount of Soviet legacy in their government, 
even as late as 2001.  The Kyrgyz elites focus on their self-legitimacy, preventing 
opposition members from gaining power and stunting growth of a national ideology.166   
The Kyrgyz and the Russians even share common avenues for controlling their 
people, such as reigning in the media and harassing journalists.167  With this common 
worldview on governance, Kyrgyzstan was able to gain a freedom of movement in its 
internal affairs, which it could not get from its relationship with Western states.  Russia 
was not likely to criticize Kyrgyzstan or withhold assistance due to allegations or charges 
of human rights violations or perceived breaches in democratic principles.  The one 
Kyrgyz internal affairs issue, which would spark Russia’s interest was the well-being of 
the Russian diaspora still residing in Kyrgyzstan. 
Kyrgyzstan’s independence in 1991 brought challenges over the role of diaspora 
minorities in the new state.  In 1991, the largest minority group in Kyrgyzstan by far was 
Russian.  The Russian diaspora in Kyrgyzstan trace their roots to three periods in Soviet 
history where industrialization, collectivization, and economic restructuring brought 
thousands of Russians into the Kirghiz SSR.168  By 1989, Russians composed 21.5% of  
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the republic’s citizens, second only to the titular Kyrgyz at 52.3%.169  The Russians in 
Kyrgyzstan held a substantial percentage of the higher skilled industrial jobs in the 
country such as manufacturing, mining, and construction.170 
The economic realities of Kyrgyzstan’s independence would significantly alter 
the balance of minority groups in the country, compelling many Russians to leave.  
Kyrgyzstan endured a massive de-industrialization with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Unfortunately for the Russian population in Kyrgyzstan, the economic “shock therapy” 
programs prescribed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund contained 
more shock than was expected.  Despite some resentment by the Russian diaspora at 
early efforts to promote a Kyrgyz national identity, the real motive for Russian 
emigration would be economic. 
Even though the Russians were a highly skilled labor force in Kyrgyzstan at the 
country’s birth, they did not represent a significant force within the upper reaches of 
Kyrgyz political strata.  In turn, the Russians were unable to carve out an economic niche 
for themselves after the massive de-industrialization occurred and were forced into 
minimal subsistence jobs.171  President Akayev understood the potential damage, which 
would follow a significant emigration of such a highly-skilled and under-utilized work 
force.  He created multiple structures to entice Russians to stay in Kyrgyzstan.  This 
included a zero-option citizenship policy, stating all residents of the Kirghiz SSR were 
legally entitled to full membership in the new Kyrgyzstan.172  Next, President Akayev 
implemented several educational programs designed to persuade Russians to stay.  For 
example, students have the choice of which language, Kyrgyz or Russian, to have their 
primary education in.  Kyrgyzstan also created a Slavic-centric university in Bishkek to 
promote the importance of Russia and Russian-studies in Kyrgyzstan.  The most 
important gesture to the Russians, though, was Kyrgyzstan’s language policy. 
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Upon independence, Kyrgyzstan constitutionally anchored Kyrgyz as the nation’s 
state language.  But President Akayev also understood that an accommodating language 
policy was needed for native and non-native Russian speakers in Kyrgyzstan.173  Initially 
determined to be the primary language for “inter-ethnic communication,” Russian would 
eventually be declared an “official” language on equal terms with Kyrgyz.174  Akayev’s 
language position was moderate, balancing those forces wanting either a Kyrgyz-based 
language policy or an “internationalist” policy advocating the primacy of Russian.175  
The move was necessary to prevent the flight of the Russians.  Only one percent of all 
Russians spoke Kyrgyz, and the prospects of Russians learning the titular tongue seemed 
slim.  Some suggest the timing of the May 2000 approval of Russian as an official 
language coincided with Kyrgyz efforts to please the new Russian President Vladimir 
Putin.176  Of more importance is the fact it took five years for President Akayev to secure 
Parliamentary approval of Russian as an official language.  The language policy was 
highly controversial, indicating a fragmentation within the Kyrgyz elites on necessities of 
such a move.   
Akayev’s treatment of the Russian minority generally pleased Moscow, and his 
willingness to promote such policies in spite of disagreement suggests other motives were 
at stake.  A possible explanation includes Kyrgyz attempts to secure Russia’s political 
favor as support for its engagement strategies with regional states, specifically 
Uzbekistan.  With a strong working relationship with Russia, Kyrgyzstan was able to 
maneuver with more confidence with its neighbors, specifically Uzbekistan.  Kyrgyzstan 
had been wary of Uzbekistan’s regional ambitions with its large population, large 
military, protectionist economy, and repressive leader.  Given its size and capacity, 
Kyrgyzstan needed political support to balance this regional dynamic. 
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At the turn of the century, several factors highlight Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with 
Uzbekistan.  The IMU incursions of 1999 and 2000 into Kyrgyzstan exacerbated existing 
differences between Uzbekistan’s President Karimov and Kyrgyzstan’s President 
Akayev.  Karimov believed Akayev was not tough enough in handling the incursions, 
allowing extremists and terrorists to operate with little government resistance.  President 
Karimov berated Akayev, saying “These things are happening because of the weak policy 
carried out by the Kyrgyz Government.  This kind of humane attitude towards terrorists 
will lead to this kind of conduct.”177  Uzbekistan had to step in and help the struggling 
Kyrgyz military with air support, which the Kyrgyz were unable to provide for 
themselves.   
Additional factors make the Kyrgyz-Uzbek relationship difficult.  The borders 
between the two countries are still being contested since each gained their independence, 
with both sides refusing to honor the settlement offers the other state puts forward.  Using 
the IMU incursions as a justification, Uzbekistan mined its border with Kyrgyzstan, 
resulting in several civilian deaths.178  Finally, Uzbekistan routinely shuts off natural gas 
supplies to Kyrgyzstan as a means of pressing its smaller neighbor to repay its debts and 
as a penalty for Kyrgyzstan’s water policy toward Uzbekistan.  President Akayev mused 
over his country’s own impotence in its relationship with Uzbekistan, noting that it is just 
“a small country unable to do much” with its belligerent neighbor.179 
To mitigate this threat, Kyrgyzstan sought Russia’s favor and support, either 
explicitly or implicitly, so it could keep Uzbekistan at bay.  These moves were 
simultaneous with Uzbekistan’s methodical decision to seek political support outside of 
Russia.  Uzbekistan did not renew its Collective Security Treaty (CST) membership in 
1999, and by mid-2000 President Karimov was denouncing Russian efforts to regain a 
foothold in Central Asia through an over-estimation of the Islamic and extremist  
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threat.180  From an external perspective, Kyrgyzstan’s preferred choice was to balance 
with Russia against Uzbekistan.  In turn, this also applied to Kyrgyzstan’s internal 
situation. 
In addition to using Russia’s political support to balance its external neighbor, 
Kyrgyzstan also used its pro-Russian policy to balance the rising influence of the Uzbek 
minority in Kyrgyzstan.  By 1999, Uzbeks surpassed Russians as the predominant 
minority group with 14% of the population.  Kyrgyz authorities, however, never pursued 
favorable policies in language or citizenship for its Uzbek citizens as it did for its Russian 
minority.  Although Uzbeks are now the largest minority group in Kyrgyzstan, there has 
been a deliberate choice to not offer the same language honors as Russian received.181   
Kyrgyz leaders were wary of the growing power base of the Uzbek minority 
inside Kyrgyzstan and used a deliberate process of inaction to keep Uzbek influence to a 
minimum.  Some speculate that the growing Uzbek population in southern Kyrgyzstan 
will lead to an increased push for Uzbek language rights in the region.182  But the Uzbeks 
are significantly marginalized in Kyrgyz society, where the established Kyrgyz feel 
threatened by the self-confident and aggressively nationalistic Uzbeks.”183  Uzbeks are 
underrepresented in both regional and national agencies, contributing to the alienation of 
the population.  Additionally, Uzbeks are some of the poorest citizens in Kyrgyzstan.  
Despite the potential instability from Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek population, President Akayev 
chose to align with the Russian minority as a way of keeping the Uzbek minority at bay. 
3. Kyrgyz Economic Benefits from Russian Engagement, 2001 
Kyrgyzstan has maintained strong economic ties with Russia since gaining its 
independence.  Their common history, similar infrastructure, and similar transitional 
challenges allowed the two countries to build strong economic relations the first ten years 
after the fall of the Soviet Union.  These historical ties give Russia a comparative 
advantage over markets such as the United States, Europe, and even China.  Much of the 
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world had not gained the confidence and the depth of knowledge necessary to conduct 
business in Central Asia.184  The Central Asian states, for their part, have made 
investment and business challenging due to the nature of their transitional economies as 
well as other systemic factors like corruption and clan patronage.  Central Asia’s 
leadership is a product of the Soviet educational and class system, with many leaders part 
of the nomenklatura, helping engrain world views on central authority and state control of 
economic matters.185  Finally, the transportation and communication link in Central Asia, 
including Kyrgyzstan’s, conveniently travel north toward Russia.  It will take a long-term 
investment to build an infrastructure able to overcome this historical advantage. 
Given these links, several protocols frame Kyrgyzstan’s economic relationship 
with Russia.  They were both original signatories of the 1996 Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) Customs Union.  In turn, the Customs Union evolved into the 
existing Eurasian Economic Community in October 2000.  Finally, President Putin and 
President Akayev signed a Treaty on Economic Cooperation for 2000-2009, aligning 
when possible the economic goals between the two countries. 
a. Kyrgyz Trade with Russia, 2001 
Given the strong historical ties between the two countries, it is no surprise 
that Russia was Kyrgyzstan’s principal trading partner in the second half of the 1990s.  In 
this timeframe, however, Kyrgyzstan’s exports to Russia had fallen from U.S. $104.8 
million to U.S. $65 million, as Kyrgyzstan attempted to diversify its export recipients 
after its 1998 accession into the WTO.  By 2000, Russia held approximately 13% of 
Kyrgyzstan’s export market, third behind Germany and Uzbekistan.   
Russian imports to Kyrgyzstan have carried the weight of the trade 
turnover between the two countries.  Kyrgyz imports from Russia have consistently been 
between 18%-26% of total Kyrgyz imports.  As will be discussed, 1999’s 18% total is a 
direct result of the 1998 Russian economic crisis.  Kyrgyzstan primarily imports its  
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petroleum from Russia since it has very little of its own reserves.  In 1999, 22% of 
imports were petroleum or petroleum-related products, highlighting Kyrgyzstan’s acute 
need for fossil fuels.186 
b. Russian Investment in Kyrgyzstan, 2001 
Like the United States, Russian foreign direct investment in Kyrgyzstan 
was sporadic and, ultimately, marginal by 2000.  Between 1995 and 2000, Russian 
investment in Kyrgyzstan never peaked above U.S. $1.2 million annually.  Russian FDI 
in 2000 was only U.S. $1.0 million, while Kyrgyzstan held a net outflow of investment 
for the year.  Two explanations are possible for such low levels of FDI.  First, the Russian 
business sector was in no position in 2000 to invest substantially outside the Federation, 
in light of the 1998 economic crisis.  Additionally, conditions in Kyrgyzstan did not 
promote deep investment.  Kyrgyzstan held few attractive privately-owned sectors 
available for investment.  Privatization of Kyrgyz telecommunication and energy sectors 
would help reverse this trend.187  Additionally, tax benefits are random in Kyrgyzstan 
and not structured in a manner conducive to attracting foreign companies.188 
c. Russian Assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 2001 
Just as Kyrgyzstan was unable to reap benefits from the Russian private 
sector in 2000, it also struggled to obtain bilateral assistance from the Russian 
government.  A major barrier to Russian assistance was the rapidly-expanding debt 
Kyrgyzstan owed to Russia.  Kyrgyzstan’s debt to Russia constitutes only a part of a 
larger and burgeoning debt problem facing the struggling nation.  The severity of the debt 
prevents Kyrgyzstan from reaping any assistance benefits at this timeframe.  As of 31 
December 2000, Kyrgyzstan’s total government and government guaranteed liabilities 
stood at U.S. $1.5 billion.  Of this, Kyrgyzstan owed U.S. $186 million (12%) to Russia, 
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making the Russian Federation its largest bilateral creditor.189  Given the extent of the 
debt, Kyrgyzstan finds Russia reluctant to provide any further monetary assistance. 
4. Kyrgyz Security Benefits from Russian Engagement, 2001 
a. Security Guarantees, 2001 
Like many of the former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan realized that 
independence brought with it several challenges, including territorial security and 
national defense.  After becoming an independent nation, President Akayev advocated 
not forming a military, desiring instead to become the “Switzerland” of Asia. “We are for 
a neutral Kyrgyzstan and do not intend to enter into any military blocks…we do not want 
an army” Akayev boldly stated.190  Akayev had three primary motives for not forming a 
military.  First, he felt that in the new post-Soviet world of Central Asia no specific threat 
existed which warranted having a military.  This low threat assessment help Akayev 
justify the second and more realistic argument against creating an independent military - 
money.  Akayev was concerned that his new state would be financially burdened upon 
independence and during market reform. A military would be an unnecessary toll given 
the world’s perceived peace.191  Finally, the first two concerns led to Akayev justifying 
collective security arrangements as substitution for a national army.  Akayev was 
immediately drawn to the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) and willingly 
threw his support to the Russian security umbrella as the answer to his armed forces 
dilemma.  Thus, Kyrgyzstan was an enthusiastic supporter of the establishment of the 
Collective Security Treaty (CST) under the CIS in 1992, believing that any security treaty 
is better than none at all.192 
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Although the Collective Security Treaty included solidarity language such 
that aggression on one state would constitute aggression on all members, the truth is that 
the CST was a structure designed against threats the Central Asian states were not 
expecting to face.193  Nonetheless, the CST was Kyrgyzstan’s principal mechanism for 
security in 2001.  Kyrgyzstan was also Central Asia’s most enthusiastic member of the 
CIS regional air defense agreement.  Since Kyrgyzstan’s Air Force was practically non-
existent, this agreement allowed it to fall under the protection of Russian-sponsored air 
defense system.  The Russians funded most of the equipment and provided training for 
Kyrgyz troops in the process.  Most importantly, though, the Kyrgyz could now rely on a 
larger source for air power support instead of having to rely on Uzbekistan like they did 
in the 1999 and 2000 incursions.194 
The IMU incursions in 1999 and 2000 demonstrated clearly to the Kyrgyz 
that they were in no position to adequately address the extremist and terrorist threat.  
What Kyrgyzstan needed was clear moral and physical support in its fight against these 
forces.  Russia was able to provide these benefits to Kyrgyzstan like no other country or 
organization could.  Kyrgyzstan solicited Russian assistance in the anti-extremist fight 
through both bilateral and multilateral avenues.  To help its campaign of securing Russian 
aid, Kyrgyzstan pledged its support of Russia’s war in Chechnya.195  More importantly 
for Kyrgyzstan, they were able to secure a stronger commitment from the Russians to aid 
Kyrgyz anti-terror and extremist efforts.   
Kyrgyzstan’s was disappointed by Russia’s unwillingness to provide 
troops during the 1999 and 2000 incursions.196  The consecutive attacks, however, 
convinced Russia that the threat was serious enough to be considered “international 
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terrorism.”197  In October 2000, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Amangeldy Muraliev was able to 
draw a pledge from President Putin of Russian assistance in countering future terrorist 
attacks.198  Although it was not a formal guarantee, it was better than any other bilateral 
arrangement Kyrgyzstan could secure. 
The Kyrgyz were also able to enlist Russian help for their anti-terror 
efforts via multilateral organizations.  Two of Kyrgyzstan’s principal security 
commitments adopted anti-terror commitments as part of their charter by 2000.  The CST 
reorganized itself functionally to address regional threats like terrorism.199  Kyrgyzstan 
and Russia, along with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, announced in March 2000 the creation 
of a CIS anti-terrorist center.200  Finally, in October 2000 the CST members committed 
to the creation of collective anti-terror forces, but stopped short of allocating specific 
units to the program. 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia were both also members of the Shanghai Five 
Organization.  Although initially conceived by China as a forum for reducing tensions on 
border-related issues in Central Asia, the Shanghai Five was evolving into a regional 
security structure by the turn of the century.  This included an emphasis on addressing 
terrorism and extremism.201 A series of summits and meetings showed the evolution of 
this organization.  In late fall 1999, Bishkek hosted a meeting of the representatives of the 
security service and law enforcement bodies from Shanghai Five members, where they 
signed a memorandum agreeing to cooperate in anti-terror, anti-narcotic, and illegal 
migration programs.  By the second of two summits in the spring of 2000, all five 
members of the Shanghai Five were advocating the creation of a legal foundation for 
their shared fight against terrorism and extremism.  The result was the Dushanbe 
Declaration, which committed the members to changing the Shanghai Five into a stronger 
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regional organization.202  This agreement also upheld the members’ commitment to build 
their own anti-terrorist center in the region.  In sum, Kyrgyzstan was able to secure 
Russia’s help in addressing its critical vulnerability against terrorism by engaging Russia 
bilaterally on the issue as well as joining Russia in regional fora designed to address their 
mutual concern. 
b. Military Benefits, 2001 
The Kyrgyz military benefited broadly from both the equipment it 
received from Russia as well as the training opportunities available either through 
bilateral agreements or via multilateral military maneuvers.  Kyrgyzstan’s military 
equipment is predominantly Russian.  Since it lacks its own defense industry it must 
continually seek support and replacement equipment from the Russians.  The Russian 
military industrial complex, however, often supplies Kyrgyzstan with equipment at 
preferential rates due to its membership in the CST.203  Russia will often unilaterally 
agree to modernize certain aspects of the Kyrgyz military when it is in its best interest.  
For example, Russia signed an agreement to modernize Kyrgyzstan’s border defenses in 
hopes of improving the Kyrgyz capacity to address insurgent crossings and illicit 
trafficking in October 2000.204  Russia entered into a bilateral agreement with 
Kyrgyzstan to provide technical equipment to strengthen the Kyrgyz border defenses on 
the Kyrgyz-Sino border, as well as modernizing and repairing communication equipment 
for Kyrgyz border troops.205  Russia also agreed at a CIS summit to provide attack 
helicopters and armored vehicles tailored for employment in mountainous terrain.206 
Russia is an indispensable source of education and training for the Kyrgyz 
military.  Kyrgyzstan does not have the capability to educate its officer corps, and thus 
most of them receive their primary training in Russia.207  In the first decade of 
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independence, it is estimated that 700 Kyrgyz soldiers received training in Russia.208  
The Russians provide critical technical assistance in Kyrgyzstan as well.  When Russia 
transferred the responsibility for Kyrgyz border security back to Kyrgyzstan, a cadre 
stayed in country to provide assistance and advice to Kyrgyzstan’s new National Border 
Service.209  Finally, Kyrgyz soldiers exercised and trained alongside their Russian 
counterparts, often in Kyrgyzstan.  Exercises like Southern Shield 2000 allowed Kyrgyz 
troops to maneuver with Russian forces in small-unit tactics against insurgent-style 
operations.210  Together, the military equipment and training Kyrgyzstan receives is 
necessary to sustain the neglected Kyrgyz military.  Without that assistance, 
Kyrgyzstan’s security situation would be grave. 
5. Costs of Kyrgyz Engagement with Russia, 2001 
Given the wide range of benefits Kyrgyzstan received from its relationship with 
Russia at the beginning of 2001, it in turn endured substantial costs across all dimensions 
of the relationship.  Although Kyrgyzstan politically benefited from balancing with 
Russia to counter Uzbekistan’s bellicose attitude, it was also subject to Russia’s whim 
whether it wanted to side with the Kyrgyz.  Even though relations had soured by 2000 
between Russia and Uzbekistan, it was not for lack of Russia trying to make the 
relationship work. 
The role of the Russian minority had yet to become a source of substantial friction 
between Kyrgyzstan and Russia as it has in other countries such as Latvia.  As President 
Putin’s tone suggests in a speech on Russian-Kyrgyz relations, the situation is one of 
mutual understanding and benefit.  Putin comments that he “…highly appreciate[s] the 
policy of the Russian language, of Russian-language cultural space.”211  Some Russians, 
however, are quick to emphasize at least vocally a willingness to protect the diaspora if 
necessary.  Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev commented that “There might be 
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cases when it is necessary to use armed force to defend our citizens and compatriots 
abroad.”212  Although many analysts agree a gap exists between Russian rhetoric and its 
capability to influence the situation of the Russian minority in neighboring countries, it 
was possible at the time for Russia to use some sort of economic stick to influence 
minority affairs in Kyrgyzstan.213  Additionally, the argument of diaspora protection is 
considered a latent Russian means to potentially influence other outcomes in Kyrgyzstan, 
not the actually end goal itself.214  The ethnic card became a hidden source of leverage 
available for Russia to use. 
Much of the animosity between Russia and Uzbekistan was due to President 
Karimov’s intransigence toward his relationship with Russia.  Karimov saw many of the 
Russian overtures in Central Asia as empty promises, only harboring Russian ambition to 
reassert itself in the region.215  But Russia knew that Uzbekistan was a critical component 
of Central Asian security, and it would be preferred if the two countries could find a 
common ground on security and economic related matters.  President Putin even offered 
to make Uzbekistan “the pre-eminent country and privileged partner of Russia” in Central 
Asia.216  Kyrgyzstan could not control or influence Russia’s engagement strategy with 
Uzbekistan, hoping to not be forgotten if a strong Russian-Uzbek alliance emerges.  For 
its part, Russia did not always approve of Kyrgyzstan’s willingness to seek Western 
support in the economic and security dimensions.  Kyrgyzstan’s request for assistance 
from Russia during the IMU incursions came at a time when Russia was trying to 
improve its relations with Uzbekistan.  Despite the emergence of a clear extremist threat,  
Russia was not willing to sacrifice its overtures to Uzbekistan for the sake of 
Kyrgyzstan.217  This partially explains why Russia offered military aircraft to Uzbekistan 
and not to Kyrgyzstan during the incursions in 2000. 
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Economically, Kyrgyzstan remained acutely sensitive to Russia.  Even though 
Russia was Kyrgyzstan’s premier economic partner, the cost it bore in the relationship 
was substantially high.  Three examples help support this point.  First, the Kyrgyz 
economy in 2000, as it had been the previous decade, was excessively tied to Russia’s 
economy.  Any tremors in Russia’s economy would undoubtedly be felt in Kyrgyzstan.  
The 1998 Russian financial crisis confirms this point.   
The collapse of the ruble directly influenced Kyrgyz exports to not only Russia, 
but to other Central Asian states like Kazakhstan.  The depressed Russian markets 
prevented Russian and Kazakh buyers from purchasing Kyrgyz non-energy and mineral 
exports, significantly impacting Kyrgyzstan’s 1999 overall export levels and, in turn, 
depressing the country’s GDP.218  Additionally, the dramatic fall of the ruble gave a 
window of opportunity to Russian exporters of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
machinery, and equipment, allowing them to suddenly be competitive with the Kyrgyz 
exporters.219  This competition cut into Kyrgyz market shares.  The final impact of the 
Russian financial crisis on Kyrgyzstan was the reduction of capital into the country.  
Russian and Kazakh investors withdrew their funds and investments from Kyrgyzstan in 
short order, including a significant number of Kyrgyz government securities.  This capital 
flight, compounded by Kyrgyzstan’s weak banking sector, made it extremely difficult for 
Kyrgyzstan to attract more investors.220 
Kyrgyzstan’s second major economic cost in its relationship with Russia in 2001 
was its exploding debt.  With the total debt to Russia at the end of 2000 at U.S. $186 
million, the interest alone was overwhelming Kyrgyzstan.  This debt became an albatross 
around Kyrgyzstan’s neck, with Russia in control of the situation.  Kyrgyzstan’s total 
debt was influencing its capacity to introduce and implement sorely needed poverty 
reduction programs.221  If left unchecked, Kyrgyzstan’s debt would prevent it from 
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achieving fiscal sustainability by 2010.222  With the massive debt owed by Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia held substantial leverage it could use as required. 
Finally, Russia had other economic sticks it could and did use during this 
timeframe to influence Kyrgyzstan.  For example, Russia imposed heavy value-added 
taxes on Kyrgyz goods.  Kyrgyz exporters were forced to pay taxes on goods, which 
typically would be paid by the Russian consumer.223  Kyrgyzstan lost U.S. $38 million 
on tariffs to Russia in 1998.224  This falls in line with the logic that Russia would use 
economic sticks with the Central Asian countries rather than carrots to manipulate 
outcomes in its favor.225 
Finally, Kyrgyzstan’s security arrangement with Russia was costly, especially if 
the Russians would remove the protection and assistance provided.  Although 
Kyrgyzstan’s security ties with Russia were not concrete, it was the best they could 
secure from any other relationship.  Being small and sandwiched between multiple larger 
states, Kyrgyzstan had no choice but to seek Russia’s favor for its security.  When 
Uzbekistan chose to not renew its membership in the Collective Security Treaty in 1999, 
it did so because it felt it could provide for its own protection in a manner just as 
successful as any regional organization could provide.  Kyrgyzstan, though, was unable 
to say the same.226  It needed Russia’s protection, seeking it through both bilateral and 
multilateral venues.   
Additionally, Kyrgyzstan was subjected to Russia’s indifference.  Russia would 
prioritize its relationship with Uzbekistan at any given moment without concerning itself 
with the ramifications in Kyrgyzstan.  Lastly, the advantage of Kyrgyzstan’s similar 
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military infrastructure and training with Russia was a cost as well as a benefit.  With so 
much of its military equipment produced in Russia and without its own industry, 
Kyrgyzstan had no choice but to seek parts, supplies, and replacements from Russian 
contractors. 
6. Assessment of the Kyrgyz-Russian Relationship, 2001 
Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Russia in 2001 is determined to be “sensitive,” 
strongly weighted by both the economic and security dimensions of this relationship.  
Despite WTO membership, Kyrgyzstan’s economy is excessively tied to Russia.  
Intentional and unintentional actions within Russian markets would severely impact 
Kyrgyzstan’s economy.  Kyrgyz debt to Russia has become unmanageable, while trade 
patterns are still tied to regional dynamics.  From a security perspective, Kyrgyzstan has 
no other option than to seek Russia’s security umbrella.  Russia was the one entity most 
likely to offer assistance should another extremist incursion occur like the ones the two 
previous summers.  Additionally, Kyrgyzstan is subject to variations in Russia’s 
commitment to Kyrgyzstan.  If Russia chose to favor another party while pursuing its 
own interests, Kyrgyzstan would be left to its own devices.  Unfortunately, Kyrgyzstan’s 
devices are not strong.  Without Russia, Kyrgyzstan would struggle for its own survival. 
B. THE KYRGYZ-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP, MAY 2005 
1. Russian Interest in Kyrgyzstan, 2005 
Russia’s interest in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 is framed by both security concerns and 
geopolitical considerations.  The U.S.-led post-9/11 military campaigns against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan benefited Russia, directly addressing the source of Russia’s 
threats stemming from its vulnerable south.  President Putin realized the potential 
advantages of the U.S.-led operations, and his willingness to support and encourage the 
campaigns against the Taliban indicates his recognition of shared responsibility to oppose 
terrorism in Central Asia.227  But there is enough evidence to suggest that by 2002 Putin 
desired to regain the initiative of state-supported security on its southern flank, seeking 
avenues to counter U.S. efforts in the region.228 
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To help justify Russia’s reinvigorated security concerns in Central Asia, President 
Putin reminded the Central Asian leaders of not only Russia’s historical ties to the region, 
but also its geographic position, permanently entwining Russia in security concerns of 
these states.  The message was that although the United States is active in Central Asia 
now, Russia will always be there forever.229  If Russia were to act as a permanent force in 
Central Asia, it needed to boost its self-image to play the part.  Putin proclaimed in a 
speech in July 2002 that Russia was a great power alongside the United States, and would 
position itself to play the part in the region.230  This posturing is less about addressing 
specific threats in Central Asia and more about regaining in the region the initiative from 
the United States.  As Russian Foreign minister Igor Ivanov relates,  
I want to tell you that most will depend not on how much hot air we talk 
but how we act in real terms in these regions.  If we actively develop 
relations with Central Asian countries, build long-term economic ties, give 
credits to serious projects, train cadres (including military cadres) cost-
free, and develop military-technical cooperation, our positions will not 
weaken.  If we only talk but do little substantial in Central Asia, then, of 
course, the vacuum will be filled by others.231 
The actual manifestation of Russia’s renewed interest is both through bilateral 
agreements and multilateral structures, using both security and economic strategies to 
attempt to bind the Central Asian Republics to Russia’s assistance.  Russia is promoting a 
forward security zone mindset to help address regional threats, significantly increasing its 
regional presence to thwart potential threats.  Russia’s decision to open an airbase in 
Kant, Kyrgyzstan with a fifteen-year lease shows Russia’s commitment to a visible long-
term presence in the region.232   
Economically, Russia seeks agreements, which also tie the Central Asian states to 
the Russian Federation.  Previous attempts at economic hegemony have been largely 
unsuccessful, with little progress achieved through efforts such as the Customs Union, 
Free Trade Zone, and Eurasian Economic Community.233  Thus, Russia has focused on 
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bilateral strategies, often through energy agreements and favorable trade arrangements.  
One analyst notes that Russia’s principle economic strategy is using subsidies and lower 
prices to maintain an ability to keep Central Asia within its strategic sphere and to 
preserve access.234  As will be seen, Kyrgyzstan was targeted with all these strategies by 
2005.   
2. Kyrgyz Political Benefits from Russian Engagement, 2005 
Both the Akayev regime and the interim government, which emerged in March 
2005 benefited from Russia’s political support, and each relationship will be explored.  
Early analysis of the March 2005 change of government emphasized that at least in the 
short term, Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Russia would not change.   
In the spring of 2002, President Akayev actively sought Russia’s political support 
after the internal crisis surrounding the Aksy riots threatened his presidency.  President 
Akayev declared to the rest of Central Asia that Russia should be the “strategic pillar” of 
the region, throwing his political allegiance directly toward Moscow.  Russia, in turn, 
filled Akayev’s need for support after both domestic and international pressure left him 
isolated after Aksy.  Russian advisors coached Akayev on how to best control internal 
security, while intelligence sharing and military pledges increased.235  Kyrgyzstan 
secured from Russia a series of bilateral political, security, and economic agreements in 
2002.  This outpouring of Russian political support culminated with a high profile visit to 
Kyrgyzstan by President Putin in December 2002. 
As the elections of 2005 approached, Russian advisors continued to play a 
significant role in helping President Akayev implement his campaign.  Akayev actively 
sought the Kremlin’s support for the upcoming elections during a January 2005 visit to 
Moscow.236  Akayev, possibly encouraged by his son and daughter, sought to stay in 
power by means of a “Soviet” style of politics.  Although Akayev was committed to 
holding both parliamentary and presidential elections per se, he knew that the Russians 
could help him “manage” the elections to guarantee a favorable outcome before the 
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voting actually began.  Akayev justified this Soviet approach as a legitimate means of 
opposing the West’s supposed manipulation of democracy through its advocacy of civil 
society via nongovernmental organizations.237  Witnessing recent elections in Georgia 
and Ukraine, President Akayev was making it clear he did not want any “exported 
revolutions” to occur in Kyrgyzstan under his tenure.238 
Russian consultants in Kyrgyzstan sought to help Akayev emerge from the 
parliamentary elections with a legislature loyal to him and his elite.  Since 2003 these 
Russian consultants had coached Akayev’s political managers on guiding the elections 
process, advising on items such as constitutional amendments stipulating regulations on 
opposition parties and legalizing barriers to large public gatherings.239  Akayev also 
attempted to curb the media’s influence in the upcoming election.  For example, both the 
cut-off of electricity to the Freedom House printing press and the removal of Radio Free 
Europe’s transmitting frequencies in Kyrgyzstan are attributed to Akayev’s efforts to 
control the election outcome.240  All these tactics came under the tutelage of Moscow’s 
political elite. 
President Akayev was not the only Kyrgyz political force seeking Russian 
support.  Members of Akayev’s opposition also began to court Russia’s favor leading up 
to the February 2005 parliamentary elections.  A week before Akayev’s visit to Moscow, 
opposition candidate and eventual interim President Kurmanbek Bakiev also visited the 
Kremlin, meeting with President Putin and pledging his support for the Kyrgyz-Russian 
relationship.241  Putin, in turn, showed his willingness to work with the opposition by 
hosting the delegation before meeting with Akayev.  After the interim government 
secured its position, the bonds with Russia were further strengthened.  Interim Foreign 
Minister Roza Otunbaeva paid an official visit to Moscow shortly after assuming control 
of the government to reaffirm Kyrgyzstan’s commitment to Russia, thanking Russia for 
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its low-key position during the March 2005 unrest.242  Additionally, interim President 
Bakiev met with Putin again during the 60th anniversary of the Allied World War II 
Victory in Europe commemoration ceremony in Moscow.   
Kyrgyzstan’s wariness toward Uzbekistan continued in 2005, and both the 
Akayev regime and the interim government sought Russia’s assistance to counter their 
unpredictable neighbor.  Bishkek was able to address one of its weakest positions vis-à-
vis Uzbekistan with Russian help.  In 2003, Russian natural gas giant Gazprom signed an 
agreement with the Kyrgyz government to build a pipeline from Russia, which would 
provide a significant percentage of Kyrgyzstan’s natural gas needs.  This deal allows 
Kyrgyzstan to break away from Uzbekistan’s monopoly as Kyrgyzstan’s supplier of 
natural gas, eliminating the random gas shutoffs Uzbekistan was prone to level on 
Kyrgyzstan.243   
In the post-9/11 security environment, Uzbekistan became an enthusiastic 
supporter of U.S. operations in the region.  Uzbekistan viewed the United States as a 
legitimate and credible security provider, openly criticizing the hollow security structures 
offered under Russian leadership.  In turn, Russia found itself unable to influence 
Uzbekistan’s external policy.244  Uzbekistan’s alignment with the United States troubled 
Kyrgyzstan, who was fearful that the U.S. security blanket would empower Uzbek 
President Karimov to take excessive liberty to bully its eastern neighbor.245  Thus, 
Kyrgyzstan’s decision to allow the Russian Air Force to lease Kant Airbase for 20 years 
has as much weight as a message to Uzbekistan as it does from its declared anti-terrorism 
charter.246 
The interim government also sought Russian assistance in its relations with 
Uzbekistan.  In May 2005, Uzbek security forces violently crushed an angry protest in the 
town of Andijon, with deaths estimated to be between 150 and 200 people.  In the wake 
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of the strong Uzbek government response, hundreds of refugees crossed the border into 
Kyrgyzstan.  The Kyrgyz interim government, fearful of instability in the region and 
wary of expanded violence in the volatile Ferghana Valley, began negotiations with the 
Kremlin over the potential stationing of up to 1000 Russian soldiers in the southern 
Kyrgyz city of Osh.247  Kyrgyz leaders are skeptical of their ability to handle mass unrest 
should instability in Uzbekistan overflow into Kyrgyzstan, and are preemptively turning 
to the one nation who would potentially contribute to crisis control in the region.   
3. Kyrgyz Economic Benefits from Russian Engagement, 2005 
a. Kyrgyz Trade with Russia, 2005 
Russia continued to be Kyrgyzstan’s principal trading partner in 2005.  In 
the post-9/11 push toward greater cooperation by Presidents Akayev and Putin, both 
leaders highlighted the growing trade bonds between the two countries.  President Putin, 
in an address during a Kyrgyz-Russian summit, highlighted the 49% increase in trade 
between 2001 and 2002, emphasizing agriculture, power, waste management, and 
defense as sectors of growing importance between the two nations.248  By 2003, Kyrgyz 
exports to Russia were at U.S. $97.02 million, representing 16.7 % of all exports and 
third among all of Kyrgyzstan’s trading partners.249  The Kyrgyz still predominantly 
focused on exporting agricultural products and value added goods to Russia.  Kyrgyzstan 
continued to import more from Russia than any other nation in 2003, with U.S. $176.13 
million of goods brought in, including critical energy imports.250 
b. Russian Investment in Kyrgyzstan, 2005 
Kyrgyzstan successfully increased its marketability to Russian investors 
since 2001, although some analysts note that Russian benevolence in investment is as 
much politically motivated as economic.251  During President Putin’s December 2002 
visit to Bishkek, the Kremlin’s trade advocate Anatoly Chubais was brought along to help  
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spark Russian interest in Kyrgyzstan.  Additionally, a Russian-Kyrgyz economic forum 
was held in October 2003, with several Russian businessmen brought to Bishkek in order 
to expand trade and investment opportunities by Russian entrepreneurs.252   
The Russians became very interested in several projects in Kyrgyzstan.  
The Kyrgyz government had been seeking foreign assistance to finish necessary repairs 
and improvements to multiple hydro-electric plants on the Naryn River, in addition to 
starting new construction projects.  By October 2002, the Russian state-controlled 
Unified Energy Systems (headed by Chubais) signed an agreement to upgrade five power 
stations over a ten-year period.  The following April during the Eurasian Economic 
Summit, contracts were signed to complete the entire construction project with Russia 
and Kazakhstan as the principal investors.253  In addition, Kyrgyzstan’s aforementioned 
agreement with Gazprom involved the Russian company’s commitment to also 
modernize the few gas fields in Kyrgyzstan in order to help increase annual domestic gas 
extraction to 300 million cubic meters, which would potentially serve half of 
Kyrgyzstan’s annual needs.254 
c. Russian Assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 2005 
Kyrgyzstan’s principal means of securing Russian economic assistance is 
through measures aimed at reducing its debt to its former ruler.  Since 2001, Kyrgyzstan 
has been able to obtain debt reduction from Russia through two principal paths – bilateral 
agreements and multilateral fora.  Between 2002 and 2003, Russia agreed to reschedule 
state bilateral debt, which was due to be paid in full by 2004.  The terms of the 
restructuring included a new 20-year program, with a fifth of the debt converted into 
Russian investments.  Additionally, Kyrgyzstan’s hosting of the Russian airfield at Kant 
as part of its CSTO commitment included debt relief as part of the compensation 
package.255 
Another significant debt-reduction opportunity came with the Paris Club 
meetings of 2005.  As part of this agreement, Russia after much resistance, agreed to 
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reduce Kyrgyzstan’s debt owed.  Like bilateral debt reduction agreements, the Paris Club 
agreement kept provisions for equity-for-debt programs rather than pure debt 
cancellation.256  As will be seen in the discussion of costs, this will still allow Russia 
some economic leverage over its much junior partner Kyrgyzstan. 
4. Kyrgyz Security Benefits from Russian Engagement, 2005 
a. Security Guarantees, 2005 
Kyrgyzstan’s security environment significantly changed since 2001.  The 
U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan either sparked or accelerated Kyrgyz efforts to 
intensify security cooperation with Russia in its wake.  Although Kyrgyzstan received a 
renewed bilateral security guarantee from Russia in 2002, its primary avenue for securing 
Russian protection by 2005 was through multilateral institutions.  
The old Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security 
Treaty (CST) was restructured in 2003 in an attempt to make it a more coherent security 
platform.  The signatories of the new Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
sought a formal legal charter, desiring to transform the CST into regionally-focused 
security architecture.257  The CSTO included broad initiatives addressing emerging 
threats through a new military command structure headquartered in Moscow.  
Additionally, the CSTO sought to create a rapid reaction force for the Central Asian 
region, a common air defense system, and efforts to create common foreign, security, and 
defense policies.258 
The first elements of the CSTO Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) was the 
air arm established at Kant Airfield, Kyrgyzstan, which initially included a combination 
of air defense, ground attack, and transport aircraft.259  Russia declared that the task force 
had a dual purpose, as it is charter-bound both to provide regional air defense through its 
Su-27 aircraft and support to land forces with its contingent of Su-25 close air support 
aircraft.  From Kyrgyzstan’s perspective, Kant represents a definitive and tangible                                                  
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security guarantee from its Russian ally.  President Akayev proudly proclaimed that 
“This [is] a certain, powerful security umbrella for Kyrgyzstan.  We are now happy that 
our military airport in Kant has revived and very modern Russian fighters are flying over 
it.”260  A land component of the CRDF was also created, with Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia all earmarking a battalion of soldiers each to this 
standing unit.261  Initially 1500 soldiers total were designated for use by the signatories 
with a coordination staff in Bishkek.262  There are suggestions that the ground component 
might grow to 3000 troops in the future.263 
From the outset, the CRDF was created with an anti-terrorist charter in 
mind, and their arrangement of forces and their recurring training support this design.  As 
part of this focus, the organization created an anti-terrorist center in Bishkek with the 
purpose of coordinating intelligence activities.  Despite the fall of the Taliban and the 
decrease on Al Qaeda’s influence in Afghanistan, Russia still sees the region as a 
breeding ground for a new generation of terrorists and seeks to face the challenge in 
Central Asia before it spreads to Russia.264 
The CSTO was not the only regional security organization to update its 
charter.  Even before 9/11, the members of the Shanghai Five treaty sought to crystallize 
their partnership into a more structured security organization.  The Shanghai Five became 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the summer of 2001.  The organization, 
which also added Uzbekistan to its ranks, declared its commitment to the “suppression of 
terrorism, separatism, and [religious] extremism.”265  With this focus, the SCO also 
created an anti-terrorist center based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and has held several anti-
terror exercises.   
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b. Military Benefits, 2005 
Kyrgyzstan was able to draw several benefits for its military forces 
through increased security cooperation with Russia by 2005.  Kyrgyzstan’s principal 
benefit was its ability to secure access to military equipment at the same prices available 
to Russian forces, which is considered to be a significant political achievement for the 
Kyrgyz government.266  In addition to traditional military equipment received, Russia 
agreed to help Kyrgyzstan regenerate the torpedo production and testing facility on Lake 
Issyk-Kul, aiding the country’s stagnant and depressed military-technical industry.267  
Additionally, by mid-2002 Russia had upgraded Kyrgyzstan’s air defense system, with 
over 100 million rubles invested in the project.268 
Kyrgyzstan also was able to focus its anti-terrorist training through several 
exercises.  These include command post exercises like Southern Shield, as well as more 
operationally-focused annual exercises like Rubezh.  In Rubezh 2004, Kyrgyzstan was 
able to exercise its special forces as part of the larger CRDF force.  The Kyrgyz military 
also contributed tanks, armored personnel carriers, and armed infantry fighting vehicles 
to the exercise.  These exercises help Kyrgyzstan’s military become a more coherent and 
lethal fighting force.269 
5. Costs of Kyrgyz Engagement with Russia, 2005 
As much as President Akayev benefited from the Kremlin’s assistance and 
support in political affairs, he also paid a price.  The cost in this case is that Akayev failed 
to secure Russia’s complete commitment in his quest for political continuity.  As early as 
2004, there were indications that the Kremlin was maneuvering to open communication 
lines with the Kyrgyz opposition.  From Russia’s perspective, having stability in the 
leadership of Kyrgyzstan is paramount because it makes the relationship predictable.  But 
when regimes like Akayev’s begin to spend an inordinate amount of time on regime 
security, the relationship becomes counter-productive.270  The Kremlin sought contact  
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with significant opposition members in order to preserve flexibility in conducting and 
implementing their regional strategy.271  A prime example of this was seen with the 
Kyrgyz opposition in January 2005.   
President Putin’s decision to host opposition leader and eventual interim President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev a week before President Akayev visited Moscow was intended as a 
message to Akayev and his regime.  Putin was indicating a certain indifference to 
Akayev’s rule.  He had been recently been unhappy with President Akayev’s “fence 
sitting,” preferring the Kyrgyz president to make a stronger and deeper commitment to 
Russia at the expense of the United States.  Russia too might not want to have pinned all 
of its hopes on Akayev, preferring stability in Kyrgyzstan over regime security.272  
Although it is clear that Russia assisted Akayev’s pre-election strategy, it appears, as one 
U.S. government analyst perceived the situation, that the Russians “did not send the A 
team” to Kyrgyzstan.273  President Akayev paid the price for Russia’s inaction, unable to 
convince his protector that his continuity was in Russia’s best interest. 
The role of ethnic minorities continues to be a point of contention between 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia.  Kyrgyzstan still desires to maintain and empower its Russian 
minority, and Russia too supports this favorable treatment of its diaspora.  The events of 
March 2005 showed, however, that a willingness by Moscow to intervene in Kyrgyz 
domestic politics to protect its citizens still exists.  During the riots and looting in the 
wake of the parliamentary elections, some Russian individuals and businesses were 
targeted by protestors.  This prompted the Russian Ambassador to publicly proclaim that 
there was a formal need to protect Russian citizens in Kyrgyzstan.  The return of Feliks 
Kulov, who is sympathetic to the needs of the Russian minority, as leader of Kyrgyz 
security services was enough to stabilize the situation.  The fact that the Russian 
Ambassador would openly call for Russian protection revalidated the latent power of the 
diaspora issue.274 
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The number of ethnic Kyrgyz working in Russia has also significantly increased, 
with an estimated 500,000 Kyrgyz migrant laborers working in Russia.  Although this 
workforce does significantly contribute to Kyrgyzstan’s economy, with remittances 
estimated at 10% of the nation’s GDP, it also opens Kyrgyzstan up to vulnerability.275  
Russia has been known to use these situations to its favor.  For example, Russia imposed 
severe visa restrictions on Georgian citizens as a political lever.276  Kyrgyz leaders are 
attempting to preempt such scenarios by pursuing dual citizenship options for its citizens, 
but are still at the whim of the Russians if they decide to lever such influence. 
In 2005, Kyrgyzstan still carries an economic burden with Russia.  Although 
Kyrgyzstan attempted to diversify its economy since 2001, it was not successful enough 
to break its dependence on Russia’s economic health.  Russia’s economy continues to be 
sustained by the energy sector.  But any future reverberations in the global energy market 
would certainly prove difficult for Russia’s economy.  A significant recession in Russia’s 
economy would in turn impact Kyrgyzstan’s fragile economy primarily because of the 
continued dominant trade ties between the two countries as well as Kyrgyzstan’s reliance 
on energy supplies from Russia and Kazakhstan. 
Kyrgyzstan still remains susceptible to the whims and desires of Russia and their 
economic priorities.  For example, Kyrgyzstan was not invited to join Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine in the proposed Single Economic Space.  This will 
continue to provide challenges for tariff negotiations since Kyrgyzstan remains isolated 
as a WTO member while those other countries are not.   
Finally, Kyrgyzstan’s debt to Russia continues to be a significant liability.  Some 
officials question if Kyrgyzstan’s debt gives Russia any real leverage, noting that Russia 
will have a hard time “drawing blood from a stone.”277  Recent attempts to force debt 
repayment through capital and equity swaps however might actually enable Russia to 
have a long-term influence capability in Kyrgyzstan.  Many of the equity-for-debt 
exchanges involve Kyrgyzstan’s transfer of idle Soviet factories to the Russians.  There                                                  
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are also Russian attempts to acquire primary shares of more important sectors.  For 
example, there have been increased attempts at Russian efforts to secure primary shares 
of petroleum distribution and retail in Kyrgyzstan. Both Russian attempts to revitalize 
Kyrgyz factories and the control of critical markets like petroleum distribution open 
Kyrgyzstan up to long-term influence and manipulation by Russian businesses.278 
Kyrgyzstan’s security costs with Russia in 2005 parallel its political costs, since 
security protection from Russia is driven by Russia’s initiative and not by Kyrgyzstan’s 
needs.  Despite the rhetoric otherwise, Kyrgyzstan is subject to Russia’s fickleness on 
whether it will receive the full support of its Russian colleagues.  The evidence suggests 
that Russian words are louder than their actions.  For example, the bilateral security 
agreements signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan are described as “broad and bland,” 
without definitive commitments from Russia to protect Kyrgyzstan.279  Multilateral 
security guarantees in which Kyrgyzstan secures Russia’s security commitments are also 
built on shaky grounds. 
The political viability of the CSTO is challenged by many analysts.  To begin, 
many observers doubt whether Russia would be willing to sacrifice its ability to act 
unilaterally for the meager benefits received through multilateral institutions.280  As 
Russia observes the United States reserve its right to act unilaterally, the Kremlin too 
wants to maintain this option to address future security concerns.  Additionally, CIS 
security structures like the CSTO have historically lacked concrete implementation 
mechanisms.  Protocols delineating responsibilities and commitments in CIS documents 
are often worded by non-binding language, giving the participants ample opportunities to 
not participate in collective security.281  The CSTO is also weakened by its partial 
membership.  The fact that the organization does not include Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan undermines its regional viability.282  Uzbekistan is arguably the most 
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powerful of the five Central Asian Republics, and its absence in the collective security 
effort highlights the difficulty of achieving consensus in the region.   
Finally, the U.S.-led Global War on Terror itself challenges the relevance of the 
CSTO.  Parallel and competing security architectures now exist in Central Asia.283  
Although the CSTO might be considered the authentic regional security force, it is the 
presence of the United States which the Central Asian states have responded to.  None of 
the Central Asian states supporting U.S. operations are asking the Americans to leave.  
All Central Asian states value their contacts with the United States and the West.  For 
example, all Central Asian states sent representatives to NATO’s Prague Summit in 2002, 
showing their willingness to interact with an organization of which they are not even 
members.284  All these indicators cast doubt on Russia’s actual willingness to address 
security threats in Central Asia, leading one to believe that the CSTO acts as a Russian 
attempt to bind Kyrgyzstan to Moscow without actually giving it the legitimate security 
guarantee it needs. 
In addition to doubts on the CSTO’s political viability, many observers also doubt 
the military capabilities of the CSTO.  The Russian experience in the Tajik civil war and 
its ongoing operations in Chechnya lead many to question the capabilities of the Russian 
armed forces to handle the low-intensity threats expected in Central Asia.285  The 
capabilities of the Russian Air Force deployment to Kant are also questioned.  Notably 
absent in the Russian deployment is any helicopter force.286  There are no assault 
helicopters in the contingent, which are often the airborne weapon of choice when 
supporting ground forces opposing insurgents.  Additionally, there are no transport 
helicopters like Mi-8s, which could rapidly move soldiers around the mountainous 
terrain.  The conventional forces which are at Kant lack any significant precision 
armament capability.  Additionally, many observers note the state of disrepair of the 
Russian deployment, with most of the aircraft inoperative and not flying.287 
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In sum, Kyrgyzstan is not pleased with Russian attempts at hegemony masked 
under a multilateral umbrella.  But Kyrgyzstan is also not in a position to ask or question 
otherwise.288  Bishkek readily perceives the sporadic nature of Russia’s commitment, but 
chooses to continue with such an arrangement because it feels it has no other option.   
6. Assessment of the Kyrgyz-Russian Relationship, 2005 
Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Russia in 2005 is determined to be “sensitive.”  
Across all three dimensions, the benefits or potential benefits remain advantageous.  But 
all three dimensions are strongly subjected to Russia’s willingness or indifference to 
assist Kyrgyzstan.  The absence of specific Russian commitment in each of the 
dimensions significantly impacts Kyrgyzstan’s domestic and external affairs.  Political 
indifference contributed to the fall of the government, while security indifference leaves 
Kyrgyzstan doubtful of Russian support but desperate for the potential of its 
commitment.  Kyrgyzstan still remains acutely intertwined to Russia’s economy, for 
better or for worse.  In all cases, the commitment is sporadic.  Kyrgyzstan is still drawn to 
this arrangement because it cannot change the nature of the relationship and it lacks any 
viable regional alternative to replace Russia.  Without significant options but in clear 
need of assistance across all three dimensions, Kyrgyzstan remains sensitive to Russia’s 
initiative. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. DATA FINDINGS 
Reviewing the results, Kyrgyzstan was considered “not-sensitive” with its 
relationship with the United States in January 2001.  By May 2005, this relationship had 
become “sensitive.”  The depth of Kyrgyz sensitivity to the United States in 2005 is 
moderate, suggesting the potential exists for a further increase in vulnerability.  
Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Russia, on the other hand, was “sensitive” in both January 
2001 and May 2005.  Although Kyrgyz sensitivity to Russia was strong in both cases, the 
evidence suggests that Kyrgyzstan’s vulnerability deepened by 2005 due to the high costs 
in all three dimensions evaluated.  In 2001, only two dimensions (security and economic) 
were deemed costly.  Kyrgyzstan is considered to have an increased vulnerability with 
the United States since 2001, while maintaining a deep vulnerability with Russia during 
the same timeframe.   
Applying these results to the cross-case outcome table (Table 3) in Chapter II 
indicates that Kyrgyzstan perceives itself to live in a realist world.  In turn, its behavior 
suggests that the country pursues, as in cross-case outcome #4, a cautious hedge betting 
strategy in its relationships with Russia and the United States.  The expectation is that 
although Kyrgyzstan is increasing its relationship and its vulnerability with the United 
States, it is also methodically sustaining it relationship with Russia at the same time.  If 
Kyrgyzstan does perceive itself to be in a realist world, then quantifiable realist behavior 
should be identifiable in their foreign policy.  Kyrgyzstan’s behavior can be possibly 
explained by multiple realist theories.  
B. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF KYRGYZ FOREIGN POLICY 
BEHAVIOR 
Although Stephen Walt’s principle proposition is that states balance against 
threats instead of power, he also argued that small and weak states are likely candidates 
to bandwagon.  The evaluation of Kyrgyz behavior after 11 September 2001 shows that it 
is actually balance of threat behavior that is seen in Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Russia.  
Russia is not the threat; Uzbekistan is.  Kyrgyzstan’s balancing with Russia against 
Uzbekistan is seen through several behaviors.  For example, attempts to relieve Kyrgyz 
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reliance on Uzbek natural gas by strengthening energy ties with Russia is a balancing 
indicator.  Additionally, Kyrgyz discussions of a potential Russian Army deployment to 
the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh to prevent Uzbek instability from destabilizing 
Kyrgyzstan shows a Kyrgyz desire to balance Uzbekistan with Russian assistance.  
Finally, the U.S. commitment to Uzbekistan following 9/11 contributes to this balance of 
threat behavior.  Kyrgyzstan worries that Uzbek President Karimov might expand the 
mandate of his partnership with the United States and use the support to manipulate 
regional affairs.  Kyrgyzstan, of course, cannot rely on its relationship with the United 
States itself to assuage these fears.  Kyrgyzstan turns to Russia instead to help balance 
against potential Uzbek aggressiveness, who itself also prefers to minimize Uzbek 
influence in Central Asia. 
Steven David’s omnibalancing theory also has some applicability to post-9/11 
Kyrgyz foreign policy behavior.  Two of the three traits David described in the behavior 
of Third World leaders are seen in Kyrgyz policy.  Considering external balancing 
against an internal threat, David claims that to focus all their effort on the most pressing 
domestic threats Third World leaders will “appease international allies of their domestic 
opponents.”289  In Kyrgyzstan, the two primary ethnic minority groups at face value seem 
likely candidates for domestic threats.  But in Kyrgyzstan, these groups are seen more as 
conduits to their native state rather than a threat itself.  Thus, Kyrgyz elite policy toward 
the two minority groups is part of their broader strategy toward the home country.  The 
Kyrgyz language policy amply proves where Kyrgyz priorities sit.   
Kyrgyzstan’s favorable treatment and institutionalization of the Russian language 
is diametrically opposed to the evolving societal composition within Kyrgyzstan, where 
the Uzbek population swells while the Russian population contracts.  The Kyrgyz 
government shows no interest in offering the same language rights to its Uzbeks citizens.  
A favorable language policy for Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan would provide incentive for 
Uzbek President Karimov to interfere in Kyrgyz affairs, since he is already suspicious of 
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the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan.290  Kyrgyzstan views its Uzbek minority not as a threat, but as 
a liability when dealing with Uzbekistan itself.  When asked if the Kyrgyz government 
would consider expanding language rights to Uzbeks, one Kyrgyz government official 
quickly and strongly said “no!…we have already given them everything they have asked 
for.”291  A favorable Russian language policy on the other hand helps maintain Russia’s 
benevolence while sustaining a skilled and educated portion of their workforce.  
Although Kyrgyz language policies do not directly support balancing against an internal 
threat, they do support mitigating an external threat through a domestic group. 
Another of David’s propositions suggests that Third World elite survival might 
supersede the priorities of the state at any given time.  The furor around Kyrgyzstan’s 
flawed 2005 parliamentary elections can potentially be seen in this light.  President 
Akayev made a conscious decision to oppose traditional free and fair elections which he 
perceived to be methods of Western destabilization.  To assist his resistance of “exported 
democracies,” Akayev chose to seek Russian assistance in his quest to manage the 
elections.  Akayev, though, misinterpreted public discontent with economic conditions 
and with the role of his family in Kyrgyz politics.  Seeking Russian assistance was 
motivated by regime survival and what is good for Akayev.  The public disagreed, and 
many publicly voiced while a few violently indicated their opposition.   
Even though Kyrgyzstan’s behavior indicates strong realist perceptions, does it 
necessarily mean it completely foregoes complex interdependence strategies?  The 
evidence suggests that although Kyrgyzstan attempts to use complex interdependence 
approaches, its capacity to bring tangible results through them is limited.  Two points of 
complex interdependency help relate this point. 
Keohane and Nye indicated that a state, given a superior position on one issue, 
could leverage that position through issue-linkage to glean benefits unrelated to the 
original issue.  Kyrgyzstan’s geography is such a case, given the reinvigorated strategic 
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interest in Central Asia after 9/11.  Both the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom 
and America’s ongoing program seeking future global access gives Kyrgyzstan 
something the United States wants – access to Central Asia.  However, Kyrgyzstan has 
not used this position in a way to push additional benefits, which it needs.  Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan John O’Keefe indicated that Kyrgyzstan in no way attempted 
to leverage stipulations and quid-pro-quo caveats on the U.S. representatives during the 
negotiation for the airbase at Manas, noting how this contrasted the position of U.S. 
representatives in Uzbekistan.292  The significant increase in U.S. assistance funds during 
FY2002 came out of the graciousness of the U.S. Congress, not the insistence of the 
Kyrgyz government.293 
The evidence also suggests that the Kyrgyz have not maximized the Russian 
deployment to Kant for additional benefits.  As indicated before, the Kyrgyz secured 
unknown amounts of debt relief for the Russian lease at Kant.  Outside of the debt relief, 
the Kyrgyz have not pursued other pressing needs through issue-linkage.  A developed 
complex interdependence strategy would have been indicated by Kyrgyz attempts to use 
the Kant deployment as a negotiation tool to secure gains such as renegotiated tariff 
policies with Russia or a formal and legal bilateral security guarantee.  None of these 
occurred with the Kant issue, contributing to impression of the weak use of complex 
interdependence strategies. 
The second weak use of complex interdependence approaches concerns 
international organizations.  Kyrgyzstan belongs to multiple international organizations.  
Within these organizations, however, Kyrgyzstan is unable to either successfully lobby 
its case or negotiate for better positions.  Two examples help elucidate this point.  
Kyrgyzstan belongs to multiple security organizations.  These include formal security 
associations like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as informal participation in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP).  Despite the multiple security avenues, Kyrgyzstan still lacks 
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a security organization it is confident in to provide physical security for its territory and 
its people.  Both the CSTO and SCO are questionable in their commitment to assisting 
Kyrgyzstan in its time of need.  Even the PfP, which provides invaluable training and 
exposure to the Kyrgyz military, fails to provide a guarantee for Kyrgyz security.  
Kyrgyzstan hopes that multiple memberships in these organizations might allow a 
medium for a true security guarantee to emerge should the country find itself in that 
position. 
Another insufficient use of international organizations is Kyrgyzstan’s use of its 
position in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace economist Anders Aslund, who also consults for the United Nations Development 
Programme in Kyrgyzstan, has argued for the past several years that Kyrgyzstan must use 
its current membership in the WTO to its advantage.  He believes that “The Kyrgyz 
Republic needs to pursue a highly liberal trade policy and exploit international 
organizations, notably the WTO, to a maximum to get as open markets as possible.”  He 
notes as well that Kyrgyzstan is under-represented at the WTO in Geneva, 
Switzerland.294  There are few indications that the Kyrgyz WTO position has been used 
successfully with either Russia or Kazakhstan.  One U.S. embassy official indicated that 
Kyrgyz representatives have tried to articulate their position in WTO negotiations over 
high Russian tariffs.  Unfortunately for the Kyrgyz, many of the other WTO members in 
the negotiations did not support Kyrgyzstan on certain tariff issues and, consequently, 
“Kyrgyzstan’s pull did not go far.”295  Without support from larger states, Kyrgyzstan’s 
position in WTO negotiations will continue to be marginalized.  
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings suggest Kyrgyzstan perceives itself to be living in a realist world 
and, in the case of its post-9/11 foreign policy behavior, is cautiously hedge betting its 
strategy with the United States and Russia.  Kyrgyzstan has deliberately increased its 
U.S. engagement strategy and, in turn, increased its vulnerability to the United States.  
The Kyrgyz political, economic, and security dimensions with the United States have all 
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matured since 9/11, and the country can be considered for better or worse vulnerable to 
the United States.  The theoretical absence of U.S. political support, economic assistance, 
or military leadership would be moderately detrimental for Kyrgyzstan, which would 
struggle to pay the costs for the absence of those dimensions after their removal.  During 
the same timeframe Kyrgyzstan also sustained its relationship with Russia and, in certain 
cases, increased its vulnerability to its former ruler.  Kyrgyzstan showed either no 
willingness or ability to decrease its vulnerability with Russia through new or 
strengthened relations with the United States.  What does this bode for U.S. policy in 
Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan? 
The first potential policy lesson from this study is that the United States should 
not overestimate its expected influence in Kyrgyzstan.  Being a small land-locked 
country with limited capability to influence the behavior of great powers, Kyrgyzstan 
chooses to play safe bets.  Kyrgyzstan would take great risks to willfully decrease its 
reliance on Russia through a strong U.S. relationship.  Although the United States could 
provide much of what Kyrgyzstan needs from a great power, an American decision to 
abandon Kyrgyzstan would be downright tragic for them.  Should Kyrgyzstan find itself 
in that scenario, isolated and without any great power support, it would have to humbly 
return to Moscow and grovel for protection.  Moscow, in turn, would certainly make the 
most of the situation and maximize its asymmetrical weight on Kyrgyzstan.  This entire 
scenario is one which Kyrgyzstan would like to permanently avoid.  Continued close 
relations with Russia therefore provide the safest bet for long-term assistance and 
protection. 
On the other hand, there are indications that a sustained U.S. engagement policy 
in Kyrgyzstan is beginning to pay dividends.  The second policy recommendation is that 
the United States should continue a patient and sustained assistance and engagement 
strategy with Kyrgyzstan.  The events of March 2005 provide proof that progress has 
been made from a democracy and civil society perspective since the country’s 
independence.  The indignation in the streets of Bishkek was solely the voice of the 
Kyrgyz people.   
103 
What is important for the United States, however, is that the thirteen years of 
financial assistance and moral support given to Kyrgyzstan helped create a favorable 
environment for the Kyrgyz people to raise their own voice.  As Edil Baisalov, President 
of the non-governmental organization (NGO) alliance Coalition for Democracy and Civil 
Society (Kyrgyzstan), stated before a hearing at the U.S. House of Representatives,  
We believe that the assistance provided by the United States directly to 
Kyrgyz civic groups and indirectly through NGOs…was instrumental in 
helping creating the space for political dialogue, raising civic awareness 
and providing support for civil society.296 
Baisalov also identified the positive role of U.S. Ambassadorial support in publicly 
promoting democracy and free elections in Kyrgyzstan.297  Dr. Martha Brill Olcott also 
highlights the payback from a long-term engagement strategy, noting that… 
The critical factor in Kyrgyzstan was NGO groups were so deeply rooted 
that there was no prospect of outlying them in the election campaign, even 
though their life was made miserable oftentimes.298 
The underlying theme of both vignettes is that the maintenance and sustainment of such 
programs is critical.  One NGO coordinator in Bishkek, a Kyrgyz citizen, freely admitted 
that “the local market is not ready” to sustain itself yet, adding that U.S. and Western 
support keeps the quality of both the programs and the people high.299  A U.S. Embassy 
official also identified the limited capability of the NGO community to stand on its own, 
optimistically calling the community a “growth industry.”300  Kyrgyz civil society and 
the media made a difference identifying a flawed election.  Although the actual efforts 
were by Kyrgyz citizens, U.S. policymakers should recognize the impact of over a decade 
of U.S. assistance on empowering the process for civil society to thrive.  Continued 
assistance can only further engrain these norms. 
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Another long-term U.S. assistance program which might be making inroads in 
Kyrgyzstan is the investment in Kyrgyz security and military forces.  U.S. security 
assistance programs are tailored to critical needs agreed upon by both Kyrgyz and U.S. 
representatives.  These programs are also slowly beginning to pay off.  One U.S. embassy 
official related how visible changes are being seen in the Kyrgyz military and security 
services.  He found their forces to be significantly more professional and Western-leaning 
in outlook in his tenure, reaching the “crawl-to-walk” stage in their development.  He 
also attributed the fact that Kyrgyz security forces did not shoot Kyrgyz civilians during 
the 24 March 2005 riots to Kyrgyz exposure to Western programs such as the Marshall 
Center in Germany.301  American investment and assistance is providing critical 
infrastructure and training facilities for the Kyrgyz military.  In the opinion of the same 
official, no other nation is able to match U.S. assistance programs for the Kyrgyz forces, 
and he is confident young soldiers and officers will remember the American assistance 
10-15 years in the future when they are in positions of importance.302 
Sustainment involves a long-term U.S. commitment.  The general consensus is 
that it will take a generation or two of Kyrgyz exposure to U.S. assistance to significantly 
transform their worldview.  Given recent public opinion polls, that assessment might be 
conservative.  When asked which country is the most important international relations 
partner for Kyrgyzstan, 84% responded overwhelmingly with Russia.  The United States 
was third with 3%, behind Kazakhstan’s 5%.303  Along similar lines, when asked whom 
Kyrgyzstan should give priority to in its future international relations, 76% of the 
respondents also answered Russia, with the United States only receiving 4% of the 
answers.  “Central Asia” collectively was second with 10%.304  Finally, 17% of survey 
respondents identified the United States as “the biggest threat to Kyrgyzstan,” second  
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behind China’s 35%.  For the same question, Russia only received 1% of the survey 
answers.305  Although these are public opinion polls and not surveys of Kyrgyz elites or 
policy makers, they nonetheless paint a strong Kyrgyz affinity toward Russia. 
Overcoming public perceptions is even more challenging when it has to be done 
half a world away.  Geography matters for Kyrgyzstan.  U.S. Embassy officials felt that 
the Kyrgyz see themselves simply as “a small country in a rough neighborhood,” and will 
pursue what is appropriate for their survival.306  Kyrgyz officials agree with their 
American counterparts.  When asked how Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy will change with 
the country’s new leadership, former Ambassador Abdrisaev indicated that nothing will 
change.  Kyrgyzstan, he said, is “figuring out just how to survive.”307  The United States 
should recognize that while Kyrgyzstan’s survival may depend on its relations with 
Russia, the United States can influence the nature of Kyrgyzstan’s political and military 
development through a sustained long-term engagement. 
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